United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
WILLIAM D. HAMBY, JR. # 135146, Plaintiff,
TONY PARKER, et al., Defendants.
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
D. Hamby, Jr., an inmate of the Morgan County Correctional
Complex (MCCX) in Wartburg, Tennessee, brings this pro
se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against Tony Parker, Lynndy Houston-Fagan, Dr.
f/n/u Mock, Centurion Corp., and Corizon Corp., alleging
violations of the Plaintiff's federal constitutional
rights. (Doc. No. 1). The Plaintiff has submitted a motion
for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 4), a motion to
ascertain status of case (Doc. No. 5), and a motion to add
defendant to suit. (Doc. No. 6).
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Motion to Amend
Plaintiff has filed a “motion add defendant to the
suit.” (Doc. No. 6). Rule 15(a) (2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure states that leave to amend should be
freely given “when justice so requires.” In
deciding whether to grant a motion to amend, courts should
consider undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the
opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated
failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.
Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 427 F.3d
996, 1001 (6th Cir. 2005).
proposed amendment seeks to add a sixth Defendant to this
action, Nurse f/n/u Shepard in her individual capacity only.
(Doc. No. 6). The Plaintiff alleges that Shepard, who works
at MCCX, refuses to provide the Plaintiff with his neuropathy
and Hepatitis C medication, his cane, and a “chrono to
cuff” the Plaintiff in the front instead of the back
“since [the Plaintiff] walk[s] out of cell cuffed in
back and [he] is in pain already from injuries.”
(Id. at 2). The Plaintiff further alleges that
Shepard's denials are based on the Plaintiff's race.
appears to be no undue prejudice to the opposing party by
permitting the Plaintiff to amend his complaint at this time;
no Defendants have been served. With regard to the
consideration of futility of an amendment, the law is well
settled that the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution requires that inmates be provided with
reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,
recreation, and medical care. See Grubbs v. Bradley,
552 F.Supp. 1052, 1119-24 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). The failure to
provide such necessities is a violation of an inmate's
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See
Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 419 (6th
Cir. 1984). The United States Supreme Court has held that
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Brooks v.
Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 127 (6thCir. 1994). The
Court finds that the Plaintiff's proposed amendment is
not futile; therefore, the Plaintiff's motion to amend
(Doc. No. 6) will be granted, and f/n/u Shepard will be added
as a Defendant in her individual capacity to this action.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on
initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court
must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro
se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
Plaintiff brings his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action
against any person who, acting under color of state law,
abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two
elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590
(6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint alleges that the Plaintiff suffers from
“severe neuropathy” and, since his arrival to the
MCCX, Dr. Mock, “the doctor who is under contract by
Centurion, ” has not provided the Plaintiff with his
medication for neuropathy and refuses to give him access to
any medical treatment for neuropathy. (Doc. No. 1 at 1). The
complaint alleges that Houston-Fagan, who also works at MCCX,
“refuses to assist in [his] medical needs as
well” and that both Defendants “allow the
denial of [the plaintiff's] meds on purpose, without care
. . . and they all do not correct the problem, or place [the
plaintiff] where [he] could get medical care.”
(Id. at 1-2). According to the Plaintiff, Mock and