United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
WAVERLY D. CRENSHAW, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Arlon Simpson, proceeding pro se, has filed a civil
rights complaint against Peggy L. Large. (Doc. No. 1.) Before
the court is the plaintiff's application to proceed
in forma pauperis (Doc. Nos. 2, 8) In addition, his
complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C.
Application to Proceed as a Pauper
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may
be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Because it appears from
his submissions that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial
resources from which to pay the full filing fee in advance,
the application (ECF Nos. 2, 8) will be
under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains
responsible for paying the full filing fee. The obligation to
pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the
PLRA provides prisoner-plaintiffs the opportunity to make a
“down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay
the remainder in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff will be
assessed the full $350 filing fee, to be paid as directed in
the accompanying order.
Initial Review of the Complaint
Background and Factual Allegations
March 30, 2012, Senior Judge W. Earl Britt, of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina issued an order civilly committing Plaintiff after
finding that he is a sexually dangerous person under 18
U.S.C. § 4248 part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006 (hereinafter “the Act”).
(See United States of America v. Simpson, Case No.
5:09-hc-02075-BR (E.D. N.C. ) (Britt, J.) Doc. No.
The District Court's finding was affirmed on appeal.
(Id. at Doc. No. 64.) On February 14, 2018,
Plaintiff filed a pro se Motion for Order to
Transfer Defendant to Tennessee. (Id. at Doc. No.
79.) In his Motion, Plaintiff sought an order of the Court
transferring him to the state of Tennessee. (Id.)
The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion, finding that
Plaintiff's request for transfer was dependent upon a
state accepting responsibility for Plaintiff's care and
treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(i) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248(g), and the state of Tennessee had not responded
to Plaintiff's attempts to be transferred to that state.
(Doc. No. 1 at Page ID## 1-2.) Additionally, the Court found
that under § 4247(i), the Attorney General is directed
to determine whether a particular facility is suitable for a
civilly committed person, and Plaintiff had not shown that
FCI Butner was an unsuitable facility, only that he would
prefer to be housed elsewhere. (Id. at Page ID# 2.)
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was civilly committed by
the United States District Court in North Carolina. (Doc. No.
1 at Page ID# 2.) Plaintiff alleges that “the Treatment
Team has submitted a written request in the plaintiffs [sic]
behalf sending to the Tennessee Interstate Complex
Coordinator to exercise the Plaintiffs [sic] Liberty
Interests of Travel and Taking Up Residence in the State of
Tennessee; To obtain Tennessee Employment and obtain Medicaid
and/or Insurance within Tennessee” (Id.
(emphasis in original)) Plaintiff further alleges that
“[t]he defendant has refused to cooperate with the
plaintiffs exercise of his liberty interests, has denied
Medicaid from the state resources, and bars the necessary
residency in Tennessee to obtain insurance for low income
persons in Tennessee.” (Id.)
relief, Plaintiff seeks “complete Due Process, and
protect the plaintiffs [sic] right to travel and take up
residency in Tennessee; thus allowing employment in Tennessee
and obtaining Medicaid and/or insurance under Tennessee
provisions for their residents, upon guaranteeing travel and
resi[d]ency.” (Id. at Page ID# 3.)
Standard of Review
action is filed in forma pauperis, “the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In assessing whether the complaint in this
case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court
applies the standards under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as construed by Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009), and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007).
See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding that “the dismissal standard articulated
in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for
failure to state a claim under [§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)]
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6)”). “Accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, the Court
‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint
to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . .
are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2)
still requires a ‘showing, ' rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual
allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only
‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”).
se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be
liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
The court is not required to create a claim for the
plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975); see also
Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 613 (6th Cir.
2011) (“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Payne v.
Sec'y of Treas., 73 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir.
2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and stating,
“[n]either this court nor the district court is
required to create Payne's claim for her”).