United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
DAVID T. JONES, Plaintiff,
SHELBY COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, OFFICER FNU WILLIAM and OFFICER FNU FISH, Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
H. LIPMANUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Magistrate Judge Charmaine G. Claxton's
Report and Recommendation (“Report”) (ECF No. 5),
filed February 14, 2018, recommending dismissal of
Plaintiff's Complaint. A magistrate judge may submit to a
judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for involuntary dismissal of an action for
failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The district judge may then
“accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition;
receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Jones complains about inhumane conditions of confinement at
the Shelby County Jail in Memphis, Tennessee (also known as
“201 Poplar”). In his Complaint, he alleges that
the jailers “[take] gang members around . . . and pass
out rubber gloves to beat inmates to death.” (ECF No. 1
at 2.) He refers to “gang control terrismson [sic]
thunderdorm [sic] cannibalism fights inside the jail.”
(ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) He also alleges that dozens of inmates
die at 201 Poplar every day, and that government officials
are feeding the bodies to the other detainees. (Id.)
to Mr. Jones, these actions are allegedly intended, in part,
either to prevent Mr. Jones from telling others about what is
going on or to retaliate against him for filing other
unspecified complaints. Mr. Jones alleges that his own life
has been endangered dozens of times over the past sixteen
years, since he began filing complaints against the Sheriff.
(ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3.) On one occasion, he complains that he
was assigned to “the suicide cell” at 201 Poplar
“because the Sheriff stated that [he] had to die,
because [he was a] witness.” (Id. at 1.) He
also complains that he was “[taken] off [his] trial in
Criminal Court, ” sent “to a mental hospital in
Nashville, Tennessee, ” and “put . . . on lots of
medication to cover up [the truth] so [that] the real state
and federal government [won't] investigate them or get
involved in this matter.” (Id. at
Judge Claxton found that the Complaint was “largely
incomprehensible” and that it failed to “assert
any coherent claim against any person or entity under any
colorable legal theory.” (ECF No. 5 at 2.) As such, she
concluded that it did not comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which require “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” and recommended that the Complaint be
dismissed. (Id. at 5.)
Court finds that the Complaint should be dismissed, agreeing
with Judge Claxton that many of the allegations here are
difficult to decipher and untethered to a cause of action. In
addition, that which can be deciphered here is
“factually frivolous.” Twenty-eight U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) directs that a district court
“shall” dismiss a case “at any time if the
court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous or
malicious.” Thus, the Court is to engage in the
“unusual” act of “pierc[ing] the veil of
the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss[ing]
those claims whose factual contentions are clearly
baseless.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).
“Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where
a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, a judge
does not have to accept ‘fantastic or delusional'
allegations . . . in pro se prisoner complaints reviewed for
frivolousness.” Id. (quoting Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327-28). A finding of factual frivolousness is
not appropriate when the Court simply “finds the
plaintiff's factual allegations unlikely.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
Rather, it is appropriate “when the facts alleged rise
to the level of the irrational or the wholly
Jones appears to be in a great deal of distress, and the
Court wishes him well. The allegations presented, however,
rise to the level of the irrational and the incredible.
See id. As such, dismissal of his Complaint is
appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as well
as for failure to state a claim.
IS SO ORDERED,
 Mr. Jones was entitled to file any
objections to the Report within fourteen days of being served
with a copy. See id. As of April 13, 2018, Mr. Jones
had filed no objections.
 Although he contests the diagnosis,
Mr. Jones's Complaint discloses that he has been
diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. (Id.) He also
complains that “disaster” follows him in and out
of state custody, and that “the medication the state
put [him] on [almost] shut down [his] ...