United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
ABDULLAH ABRIQ, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated
METROPLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND PROTECTIVE ORDER
BARBARA D. HOLMES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County has
filed a motion to compel Plaintiff to answer interrogatories
and provide documentation about his immigration status, the
status of his immigration proceedings, and the information
that ICE possessed to support its arrest of Plaintiff.
See Docket Nos. 148 and 149. Plaintiff filed a
response in opposition (Docket No. 155) requesting a
protective order precluding Metro from inquiring into these
also moved for leave (Docket No. 163) to file a reply to
Plaintiff's response, which is GRANTED. The Clerk is
directed to file Metro's response found at Docket No.
163-1. The Court has considered Metro's motion,
Plaintiff's response in opposition, and Metro's
reply. For the reasons stated herein, Metro's motion
(Docket No. 148) is DENIED except as provided herein.
request for a protective order is GRANTED as provided herein.
described in Judge Campbell's recent memorandum opinion
ruling on Metro's motion to dismiss,
[t]his purported class action is one of several such cases
filed across the country in recent years challenging the
constitutionality of local law enforcement's detaining
immigrants subject to detainers from the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). Plaintiff Abdullah Abriq is a foreign
national who immigrated to the United States under an F-1
student visa. Plaintiff resided in Davidson County and
attended Tennessee State University. Plaintiff alleges that
he has never been arrested for or convicted of a crime.
Plaintiff alleges that, on April 6, 2017, ICE officials took
custody of him, pending civil removal proceedings. Plaintiff
contends that, also on April 6, 2017, ICE officials
transferred custody of him to the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) at the
Davidson County Jail, where he was held until April 11, 2017.
Plaintiff alleges that ICE had no warrant or probable cause
to arrest him. Plaintiff also alleges that Metro had no
warrant or probable cause to believe Plaintiff had committed
a criminal offense or to take custody of him, and that Metro
had no lawful authority to hold him as an immigration
Plaintiff contends that, despite the agreement's
expiration and having no new § 287 agreement, Metro,
through an ongoing custom, policy and practice and at the
direction of Sheriff Hall, has continued to
“seize” and hold administrative detainees for
ICE, including Plaintiff, with no lawful authority to do so.
No. 136 at 1-2. Of the claims originally made by Plaintiff,
only his Fourth Amendment claim remains, all other claims
having been dismissed upon Metro's motion. Docket No.
137. Metro denies any violation of Plaintiff's rights
under the Fourth Amendment and asserts that it acted lawfully
in detaining Plaintiff.
general matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 allows
discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b). The trial
court has wide discretion when dealing with discovery
matters. S.S. v. E. Kentucky Univ., 532 F.3d 445,
451 (6th Cir. 2008). This includes when deciding if
information might be relevant. Id. A party may move
for an order compelling discovery under Rule 37(a) after
“the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to
confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or
discovery in an effort to obtain it without court
action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1); Local Rule 37.01(a).
Under Rule 26(c), the court may, for good cause, issue an
order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). The “good cause” necessary to
sustain a protective order under Rule 26(c) must be ...