United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF
APPELLATE FILING FEE, AND CAUTIONING PLAINTIFF ABOUT
RESTRICTIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
THOMAS ANDERSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
October 20, 2016, Plaintiff Mario Marquette Myers a/k/a
Maleik Ali Bey (“Myers”), a pre-trial detainee at
the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center in Memphis,
Tennessee, filed pro se a Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). The Court granted
Myers leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record
the Defendants as Shelby County,  Shelby County Deputy
Response Team (“DRT”) Deputy K. Williams, Shelby
County DRT Deputy J. Griffin, Shelby County Fugitive Deputy
Mr. First Name Unknown (“FNU”) Carter, Shelby
County DRT Lieutenant FNU Tuggle, Nurse Ms. FNU James, Nurse
Mr. FNU Haywood, and Dr. FNU Washington.
not Myers's first civil action in this Court. On March
20, 2017, the Court dismissed a case filed by Myers and
imposed specific restrictions on Myers's ability to avail
himself of filing in forma pauperis. See Myers
v. Correct Care Solutions, No. 16-2135-JDT-cgc (W.D.
Tenn. Mar. 20, 2017) (providing a synopsis of the dismissal
of Myers's previous IFP cases for failure to state a
claim as well as implementing filing restrictions). Even
though this is now Myers' fourth suit filed in forma
pauperis under the PLRA, Myers filed this action prior to
March 20, 2017. Therefore, the Court will address the merits
of the Complaint.
October 4, 2016, Myers was charged with aggravated sexual
battery. (https://cjs.shelbycountytn.gov, Indictment
No. 1603621-16621756.) Myers's case is still pending. In
the Complaint at bar, Myers alleges that on October 4, 2016,
Defendants Williams, Griffin, and Carter used excessive force
against Myers in an effort to compel Myers to give his
fingerprints. According to Myers, the officers were booking
him for the battery charge, which had already been dismissed
for lack of prosecution on December 17, 2015. (Compl. at 2,
ECF No. 1.) Myers contends that the officers' use of
force caused cracking in Myers's thumb nails, a cut to
his left thumb, and swelling in both wrists. (Id. at
3.) Myers alleges that Defendants Williams and Griffin placed
the handcuffs on him too tightly and twisted and pulled the
cuffs on Myers's wrists in order to get Myers's
fingerprints. (Id.) Myers was seen in medical for
his injuries and received a bandage and ibuprofen.
(Id.) Myers's request for an x-ray was denied.
(Id.) Myers now seeks an order of protection against
Defendants as well as punitive, compensatory, and nominal
damages in the total amount of $5 million. (Id. at
has addressed a separate letter to the Court including
additional allegations about the events of October 4, 2016.
(ECF No. 6.) Myers contends that Defendants Williams and
Griffin forced Myers to hang up a paid phone call.
(Id. at 2.) Myers filed a grievance, number 420222,
on October 5, 2016, and was denied relief. (Id.,
see also Exhibit A-1.) Myers contends that the
officers failed to answer his complaint or his appeal in a
timely manner. (Id.) Myers's letter goes on to
state that he did not receive “adequate” medical
attention. (Id.) Myers believes he was improperly
denied outside medical care from a specialist and was told by
Defendant Washington that he would have to pay for x-rays.
(Id.) Myers requests that he be seen immediately by
a “qualified” physician who can perform an x-ray.
(Id. at 5.)
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
assessing whether the Complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the
pleading standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677˗79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555˗57 (2007). Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470˗71 (6th Cir. 2010).
“Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual
allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original).
“[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions .
. . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they
must be supported by factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a
‘showing, ' rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the
complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the
requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice' of
the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on
which the claim rests.”).
complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any
complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29
Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§
1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from
whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes
allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give
“judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the
unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's
factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual
contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a
claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as
true, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not