Assigned on Briefs April 3, 2018
from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 98-03611 Chris
petitioner, Rickey Williams, appeals the Shelby County
Criminal Court's denial of his "Ex Parte Injunction
and/or Show Cause Order." On appeal, the petitioner
contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his
motion "because his conviction is voidable." The
State contends the petitioner's appeal is not properly
before this Court and, despite the lack of jurisdiction, the
petitioner is not entitled to relief on the merits of his
claim. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs,
we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
R. App. P. 3 as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court
Williams, Clifton, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David
H. Findley, Senior Counsel; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney
General; and Karen Cook, Assistant District Attorney General,
for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Ross Dyer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which
D. Kelly Thomas, Jr. and Robert L. Holloway, Jr., JJ.,
ROSS DYER, JUDGE
convicted the petitioner of murdering Algerine Bougard in her
apartment on or about December 1, 1997, for which he received
a sentence of life in prison. The petitioner appealed, and
this Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. See
State v. Rickey Williams, No. W1999-01701-CCA-R3-CD,
2001 WL 128557 at *2, (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 15, 2001),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 16, 2001).
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for
post-conviction relief, claiming he received the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel on several grounds and the trial
court improperly instructed the jury. The post-conviction
court denied the petition for post-conviction relief, and the
petitioner appealed. On appeal, this Court affirmed the
ruling of the post-conviction court. Williams v.
State, No. W2006-00605-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 2120174, at *5
(Tenn. Crim. App. July 24, 2007), no perm. app.
September 8, 2017, the petitioner filed a pro se
motion for "Ex Parte Injuction (sic) and/or Show Cause
Order" claiming, the Tennessee Department of Correction
did not have "proper custody over [petitioner]'s
person" because the judgments in his case do not contain
a "file-stamp" showing when the judgments were
entered. That same day, the trial court entered an order
summarily dismissing the petitioner's motion.
Specifically, the trial court noted the trial judge signed
the petitioner's judgment on October 14, 1999, and that
the "court jacket reflect[s] that the judgment was filed
by the court clerk that date, as would the court minutes for
that date." The trial court also concluded that
"the lack of a file stamp on the judgment is not
jurisdictional." Additionally, though not directly
raised by the petitioner as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, the trial court considered his motion as such. In
doing so, the trial court held that the petitioner's
"conviction appears to be proper from the technical
record, and has not expired. Because the petitioner has
failed to show that the trial court was without jurisdiction
to impose the challenged sentence, or that he is presently
held on an expired sentence, he is not entitled to
relief." This timely appeal followed.
appeal, the petitioner contends the trial court erred in
summarily dismissing his motion arguing, his
"confinement is voidable since the clerk failed to
properly enter his 1997 judgment pursuant to Tennessee Rule
of Criminal Procedure 32(e)." The State contends the
petitioner's case is not properly before this Court
because there is no appeal as of right from the denial of an
"Ex Parte Injunction and/or Show Cause Order."
Alternatively, the State argues the petitioner is not
entitled to relief on the merits of his claim. Upon our
thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the
decision of the trial court.
State correctly notes the petitioner does not have a right of
appeal from the denial of a motion for an "Ex Parte
Injunction and/or Show Cause Order." See Tenn.
R. App. P. 3(b). However, the trial court also considered the
petitioner's motion as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. See Castro v. United States,540 U.S. 375,
381, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) (allowing
re-characterization of pro se litigants motion to
place it within a different legal category). Because the
trial court treated the motion as such, the petitioner's
appeal is properly before this Court, and we will review ...