United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
the Court are two Reports and Recommendations by the
Magistrate Judge. The first (“Report I”), entered
on October 13, 2017, recommends that Defendant Genworth
Mortgage Insurance Corporation's (“Defendant
Genworth”) motion for judgment on the pleadings be
granted. (ECF No. 62; ECF No. 58.) Plaintiff Lo-lina Porter
has not responded.
second (“Report II”), entered on January 23,
2018, recommends that Defendant GMAC Mortgage, LLC's
(“Defendant GMAC”) motion to dismiss
Plaintiff's claims against it pursuant to an order
entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York (“Motion to
Dismiss”) be granted. (ECF No. 71; ECF No. 59.)
Plaintiff has not responded.
reasons below, Report I and Report II are ADOPTED. Defendant
Genworth's motion for judgment on the pleadings and
Defendant GMAC's Motion to Dismiss are GRANTED.
October 22, 2010, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint
in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee for the
Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis. (ECF No. 1-3.) The
complaint alleges that Defendants wrongfully foreclosed on
Plaintiff's rental property through “predatory
lending.” (Id. at 18-20.) The complaint
also asserts claims for deceptive practices, infliction of
emotional distress, and “slander of title/slander of
credit/violations of consumer protection act.”
(Id. at 20-26.)
November 29, 2010, Defendants filed a Notice of Removal to
this Court. (ECF No. 1.) On September 9, 2011, and on June 7,
2017, the Court entered Orders dismissing all of
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Aurora Loan
Services, LLC. (ECF Nos. 16, 56.) Defendant Genworth and
Defendant GMAC are the only remaining Defendants.
September 7, 2017, Defendant Genworth filed its motion for
judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 58; see also ECF No.
58-1.) Defendant Genworth argues that Plaintiff's claims
against it “should be dismissed in their
entirety” because “Plaintiff fails to adequately
plead a claim for ‘deceptive practices, '”
“fails to plead sufficient facts to support a claim of
invasion of privacy, ” and “has alleged no
damages against [Defendant] Genworth, rendering
[Plaintiff's] claim moot.” (ECF No. 58-1 at 650.)
October 13, 2017, United States Magistrate Judge Diane K.
Vescovo entered Report I. (ECF No. 62.) Report I recommends
that “[Defendant] Genworth's motion for judgment on
the pleadings be granted in full and that [Plaintiff's]
claims against [Defendant] Genworth be dismissed for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
(Id. at 683.)
September 14, 2017, Defendant GMAC filed its Motion to
Dismiss. (ECF No. 59; see also ECF No. 59-1.) The
Motion to Dismiss asks “the Court to dismiss [GMAC] as
a party with prejudice pursuant to a Bankruptcy Court Order
entered on February 11, 2016 . . . in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York.” (ECF No. 59 at 659.) The Bankruptcy Court Order,
which is attached to the Motion to Dismiss, requires
Plaintiff to dismiss her monetary claims against Defendant
GMAC. (ECF No. 59-1 at 663.)
January 23, 2018, the Magistrate Judge entered Report II.
(ECF No. 71.) Report II recommends “that [Defendant]
GMAC's [Motion to Dismiss] be granted in full and that
[Plaintiff] Porter's claims against [Defendant] GMAC be
dismissed pur- suant to the Bankruptcy Court Confirmation and
Enforcement orders, or, in the alternative, pursuant to the
doctrine of res judicata.” (Id. at 749.)
enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the
federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of
district-court duties to magistrate judges. See United
States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70
(1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed.Appx.
308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). A district court has the authority
to “designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings,
including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of
the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
the disposition, by a judge of the court, of any
motion.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
district court has appellate jurisdiction over any decisions
the magistrate judge issues pursuant to a referral. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. “A district judge must
determine de novo any part of a Magistrate
Judge's disposition that has been properly objected
to.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
The district court is not required to review -- under a
de novo or any other standard -- “any issue
that is not the subject of an objection.” Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). The district court should
adopt the ...