Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Pickett v. McCage

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division

May 11, 2018

BYRON JEFFERSON PICKETT, III, Plaintiff,
v.
MIKE MCCAGE, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, and RN SHANE, Defendants.

         ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL, DENYING REQUEST FOR HEARING, PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT, DENYING MOTION TO ASCERTAIN STATUS OF CASE, AND DIRECTING CLERK TO ISSUE PROCESS FOR DEFENDANT MCCAGE AND DELIVER TO THE U.S. MARSHAL FOR SERVICE

          J. DANIEL BREEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         On May 19, 2017, Plaintiff, Byron Jefferson Pickett, III, an inmate then incarcerated at the Northwest Correctional Complex (“NWCX”) in Tiptonville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 2; D.E. 1.) The Court granted Pickett leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b). (D.E. 4.) On July 3, 2017, Plaintiff notified the Court that he had been transferred from NWCX to the Morgan County Correctional Complex in Wartburg, Tennessee. (D.E. 5.) Pickett filed a “Supplemental [sic] to Complaint and Motion to Issue Service of Summons” on April 16, 2018.[1] (D.E. 9; see also D.E. 7.) Because the allegations in the Amended Complaint occurred in Tiptonville, Tennessee, while the inmate was housed at NWCX, venue is proper in this Court. (See D.E. 1.)

         BACKGROUND

         In his Amended Complaint, Pickett alleges that he was subjected to excessive force and medical indifference in violation of his constitutional rights. (D.E. 1 at PageID 2-4; see also D.E. 1-1 at PageID 5-6.)

         The inmate contends that on February 28, 2017, while he was behind a locked door that was also padlocked, he complained to Corporal (“Cpl.”) Robert Stephenson, who is not a party to this action, that another “inmate in [his] pod had not received toilet paper in 10 days.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 2-3.) To stop Cpl. Stephenson from walking away, Plaintiff alleges that he put his “arm in the way of preventing the pie-flap from being closed.” (Id. at PageID 2.) He claims that Captain (“Cpt.”) Mike McCage “was then called” and “[w]ithout any warning . . . drew his taser and shot [Plaintiff] with it, ” (id.), “through the pie flap of his cell door” while the inmate “was sitting on a stack of books, inside his cell, with his arm resting on the pie flap, ” (D.E. 9 at PageID 29). One taser prong struck Pickett's arm and the other “hit [him] in [his] right eye.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 2.) The inmate asserts that he presented no immediate threat to Cpt. McCage and that the taser prong that hit his eye “caused severe damage, ” including bleeding for the remainder of the night. (Id. at PageID 3.)

         Next, Pickett maintains that “RN Shane washed [Plaintiff's] eye out and sent [him] back to the pod, still bleeding[, ] and did not contact the doctor or hospital to get [him] the help [he] neede[d].” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he “wasn't seen until the next day when the doctor immediately ordered [him] to go to the hospital, ” where he stayed for two days. (Id.) When he returned to NCWX, the inmate “couldn't see clearly enough to file a grievance[, ] which is why [his] grievance was late.” (Id.) Pickett claims that he sustained “permanent damage to his eye and went through two surgeries.” (D.E. 9 at PageID 29.)

         The inmate seeks to have Cpt. McCage and RN Shane fired, $2 million in compensation, the appointment of counsel, and a hearing regarding his alleged deprivation of rights. (D.E. 9 at PageID 29; D.E. 1 at PageID 4.)

         SCREENING STANDARD

         The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To assess whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the pleadings standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing, ' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” (citing another source)).

         Despite being “held ‘to less stringent standards, '” pro se parties, including those that are incarcerated, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)); see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 Fed.Appx. 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“declin[ing] to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants”).

         I. Section 1983

         42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.