United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
WILLIAM L. CAMPBELL, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Steven Minor, an inmate of the Montgomery County Jail in
Clarksville, Tennessee, has filed a pro se complaint for
alleged violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which he has supplemented with a separate
filing. (Docs. No. 1, 5.) He has also filed an application to
proceed in district court without prepaying fees and costs
(“IFP application”), which he has supplemented
with copies of receipts from the jail that reflect his
account balance there. (Docs. No. 2, 6.) The case is before
the Court for a ruling on the IFP application and for an
initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
Application to Proceed as a Pauper
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner bringing a civil action may
be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Ordinarily, the Court
will not consider an IFP application unless it is signed and
notarized by an appropriate corrections official as set forth
in Administrative Order 93, and accompanied by a certified
copy of the plaintiff's trust fund account statement (or
institutional equivalent) for the 6-month period immediately
preceding the filing of the complaint, obtained from the
appropriate official at each facility in which the plaintiff
has been confined during that 6-month period. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(2). Plaintiff's IFP application does not
comply with those requirements, but his supplemental IFP
filing indicates that he has tried and been unable to get
jail staff to provide the necessary statement and signature.
(Doc. No. 6 at 8.) He has also filed copies of several jail
receipts that establish that he is being provided with
“indigent packs” at no charge in jail, and that
on several dates since December 2017 his inmate balance has
ranged from 15 cents to 29 cents. (Doc. No. 6 at 4-7.) Under
the circumstances, Plaintiff's IFP application (Docs. No.
2, 6) is GRANTED.
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b) and 1914(a), Plaintiff must
still pay the $350.00 civil filing fee in installments. The
administrator of the facility in which Plaintiff is currently
incarcerated, as custodian of his trust account, is
DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as
an initial payment, the greater of: (a) 20% of the average
monthly deposits to Plaintiff's credit at the jail; or
(b) 20% of the average monthly balance to Plaintiff's
credit for the six-month period immediately preceding the
filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of Plaintiff's
preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff for
the preceding month), but only when the balance in his
account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). Payments
shall continue until the $350.00 filing fee has been paid in
full to the Clerk of Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(3).
Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this
Order to the administrator of the Montgomery County Jail to
ensure payment of the filing fee. If Plaintiff is transferred
from his present place of confinement before the fee is paid
in full, the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order
follows him to his new place of confinement, for continued
compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to this
Order must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
801 Broadway, Nashville, TN 37203.
Initial Review of the Complaint
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to
conduct an initial review of any complaint filed in forma
pauperis, and to dismiss the complaint if it is facially
frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. In
reviewing the complaint to determine whether it states a
plausible claim, “a district court must (1) view the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
(2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.”
Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d
478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted)). A pro se pleading must be liberally
construed and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
alleges that on March 4, 2016, as he was trying to collect
his belongings to vacate a woman's home as required by a
no-contact order, the woman initiated an argument and
ultimately stabbed him in the abdomen several times. (Doc.
No. 5 at 1.) The police arrived while or soon after Plaintiff
was being stabbed, but rather than fully investigate the
incident they immediately placed him in handcuffs and took
him into custody. (Doc. No. 5 at 1-2.) Plaintiff was bleeding
and shaking and told Defendant Binkley, one of the officers
on the scene, that he had been stabbed, but Binkley refused
him any medical care. (Doc. No. 1 at 7; Doc. No. 5 at 2.)
Plaintiff continued to plead with the other officers on the
scene - Defendants Terry, Rosencrants, and Hendricks - for
medical help, and repeatedly “blacked out” on the
ride to the jail, but the officers ignored him. (Doc. No. 1
at 2-3; Doc. No. 5 at 2.) When Plaintiff arrived at the jail
and complained of his injuries to the staff there, they
replied “I know it hurts, you just need to keep it
clean.” (Doc. No. 5 at 2.) He did not receive treatment
until two weeks later, when he was given medication that he
only took for one week because it caused more uncomfortable
side effects than relief. (Id.)
also alleges that the officers violated his constitutional
rights by racially profiling him and not fully investigating
the incident or arresting the woman who stabbed him. (Doc.
No. 1 at 7.) He says that he was the true victim on that day,
but that the officers did not confiscate his attacker's
knife, take any photos, or arrest her. (Doc. No. 5 at 2.) He
seeks $250, 000 in damages from each Defendant, and asks to
have “Officer Binkley charged with perjury.”
(Doc. No. 1 at 8.)
lawsuit is clearly barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. The statute of limitations that applies to
Section 1983 actions arising in Tennessee is one year. Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a); Roberson v. Tennessee,
399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff's claim
against the named Defendants for violation of his
constitutional right to medical care could not have accrued
any later than March 4, 2016, the date on which they briefly
held him in custody before depositing him at the
jail. Likewise, the limitations period on any
claim Plaintiff had against the officers for false arrest
began to run on or within days of his arrest, and the statute
of limitations proceeded to run from that point without being
tolled by his prosecution or subsequent conviction.
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 390, 392-95 (2007)
(rejecting the argument that Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), delays accrual of claim for unlawful arrest
and holding that limitations period for such claim began to
run as soon as plaintiff appeared before magistrate and was
bound over for trial); Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 235
(6th Cir. 2007) (applying Wallace to hold claims for
excessive force and unlawful arrest barred by statute of
limitations). Under the prison mailbox rule, Plaintiffs
complaint is deemed filed on April 20, 2018, the day on which
he signed it and presumably deposited it in the prison mail
room for filing. (Doc. No. 1 at 9.) Accordingly, Plaintiff
filed his lawsuit more than a year too late.
to the extent that Plaintiffs complaint might be construed to
allege an ongoing violation of his constitutional right to
have his attacker arrested or prosecuted, no such right
exists. Napier v. Baron, 198 F.3d 246, 1999 WL
1045169 (6th Cir. Nov. 9, 1999) (“[C]ontrary to
Napier's belief, he does not have a constitutional right
to have a particular person criminally charged and
reasons explained above, this action is DISMISSED
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. Any appeal of this Order would ...