United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ANTHONY T. GROSE, SR., Plaintiff,
STEVEN T. MNUCHIN, Secretary of the United States Department of the Treasury, Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUGMENT
L. PARKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Western District of Tennessee Administrative Order 2013-05,
the Magistrate Court considered Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”). (ECF No. 74 at PageID
2827.) The R&R recommends “that Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.” (Id.)
Plaintiff Anthony T. Grose, Sr. (“Plaintiff or
“Mr. Grose”) timely objected to the R&R, (ECF
No. 78), and Defendant Steven T. Mnuchin, Secretary of the
United States Department of the Treasury (“Defendant,
” or “Secretary of Treasury”) responded to the
objections. (ECF No. 79.)
following reasons, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and
Plaintiffs claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
following standards of review apply in this matter.
De novo Review of the R&R
reviewing a Report and Recommendation from the Magistrate
[a] judge of the court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence
or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b); accord Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(3). After conducting a de novo review, a
district court is not required to articulate all of the
reasons it rejects a party's objections. Tuggle
v. Seabold, 806 F.2d 87, 92 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Although this standard does not require “detailed
factual allegations, ” it requires more than
“labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) tests the
sufficiency of the complaint's allegations by arguing
that the allegations establish no claim for which relief can
be granted. A court considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) must “construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d
471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007). A court need not accept as true
legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.
Hananiya v. City of Memphis, 252 F.Supp.2d 607, 610
(W.D. Tenn. 2003) (citing Lewis v. ACB Business Servs.,
Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998)).
survive a Motion to Dismiss, the complaint has to assert more
than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the
claim's elements. Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand
Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “‘[A]
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
Conclusory statements are not assumed to be true.
Id. at 678-79.
The Summary Judgment Standard
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Chapman v. UAW Local
1005, 670 F.3d 677, 680 (6th Cir. 2012). “A fact
is material for purposes of summary judgment if proof of that
fact would establish or refute an essential element of the
cause of action or defense.” Bruederle v.
Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A dispute
over material facts is ‘genuine' ‘if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Id.
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “When the
non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an
essential element of his case on which he bears the burden of
proof, the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and summary judgment is proper.”
Chapman, 670 F.3d at 680 (citing Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); accord Kalich
v. AT & T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir.
moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of any genuine issue of material fact.”
Mosholder v. Barnhardt,679 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir.
2012) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323).
“Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden,
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth
specific facts showing a triable issue of material