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Green v. Parker

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

May 22, 2018

JAMIE C. GREEN, # 151209, Plaintiff,
v.
TONY C. PARKER, et al., Defendants.

          MEMORANDUM

          Aleta A. Trauger United States District Judge.

         Jamie C. Green, an inmate of the Bledsoe County Correctional Center in Pikeville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tony C. Parker, Darren Settles, Doug Lawhorn, f/n/u Bendal, K. Miller, B. Kidd, and Leonard Attaway, alleging violations of the Plaintiff's civil rights. (Docket No. 1).

         The plaintiff's complaint is before the court for an initial review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

         I. PLRA Screening Standard

         Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, ” id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).

         The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).

         Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts' “duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

         II. Section 1983 Standard

         The plaintiff brings his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

         III. Alleged Facts

         The complaint alleges that, on December 31, 2016, the plaintiff was taken into custody in Davidson County, Tennessee. While in the custody of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Sheriff's Office, the plaintiff was denied his mental health medication on during the period January 1-12, 2017. The plaintiff was released on January 12, 2017, but was “so off schedule” of his mental health medications that he did not remember who he was, where he was, or what he needed to do to take care of himself. (Docket No. 1 at 8). The plaintiff then attempted to kill himself by running out in front of traffic on the interstate. (Id. at 8-9).

         On February 16, 2017, parole officer Leonard Attaway “put a warrant out on [the plaintiff] for a parole violation.” (Id. at 9). The plaintiff learned about this action through the Institutional Probation/Parole Officer (IPPO). The plaintiff was taken into the custody of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Sheriff's Office for the parole violation on June 22, 2017. (Id.) Bendall “forced himself” on the plaintiff “as a representative and coerced” the plaintiff to waive his right to a probable cause hearing. (Id.)

         The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was never permitted to see a magistrate after his arrest and this denial violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 14). The complaint also alleges that defendants Settles, Kidd, Parker, Lawhorn, Bendall, and Miller knew of the violations of the plaintiff's rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and failed to act for the plaintiff's benefit. (Id. at 15). The complaint additionally alleges that the plaintiff wrote Parker a letter informing Parker of the Plaintiff's allegations and Parker did nothing to help the plaintiff; that Settles “is responsible for the operation of BCCX”; and that Kidd, Chief of Security at the Davidson County jail, created a policy allowing the staff to violate the fourteenth Amendment due process . . . and 13th Amendment.” (Id. at 16).

         IV. ...


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