United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
JAMIE C. GREEN, # 151209, Plaintiff,
TONY C. PARKER, et al., Defendants.
A. Trauger United States District Judge.
C. Green, an inmate of the Bledsoe County Correctional Center
in Pikeville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma
pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tony
C. Parker, Darren Settles, Doug Lawhorn, f/n/u Bendal, K.
Miller, B. Kidd, and Leonard Attaway, alleging violations of
the Plaintiff's civil rights. (Docket No. 1).
plaintiff's complaint is before the court for an initial
review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis
that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on
initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court
must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers, USA, LLC, 561F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro
se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall,
610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
plaintiff brings his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action
against any person who, acting under color of state law,
abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two
elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590
(6th Cir. 2003); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint alleges that, on December 31, 2016, the plaintiff
was taken into custody in Davidson County, Tennessee. While
in the custody of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville
and Davidson County Sheriff's Office, the plaintiff was
denied his mental health medication on during the period
January 1-12, 2017. The plaintiff was released on January 12,
2017, but was “so off schedule” of his mental
health medications that he did not remember who he was, where
he was, or what he needed to do to take care of himself.
(Docket No. 1 at 8). The plaintiff then attempted to kill
himself by running out in front of traffic on the interstate.
(Id. at 8-9).
February 16, 2017, parole officer Leonard Attaway “put
a warrant out on [the plaintiff] for a parole
violation.” (Id. at 9). The plaintiff learned
about this action through the Institutional Probation/Parole
Officer (IPPO). The plaintiff was taken into the custody of
the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Sheriff's Office for the parole violation on June 22,
2017. (Id.) Bendall “forced himself” on
the plaintiff “as a representative and coerced”
the plaintiff to waive his right to a probable cause hearing.
complaint alleges that the plaintiff was never permitted to
see a magistrate after his arrest and this denial violated
the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
(Id. at 14). The complaint also alleges that
defendants Settles, Kidd, Parker, Lawhorn, Bendall, and
Miller knew of the violations of the plaintiff's rights
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and failed to act for the plaintiff's
benefit. (Id. at 15). The complaint additionally
alleges that the plaintiff wrote Parker a letter informing
Parker of the Plaintiff's allegations and Parker did
nothing to help the plaintiff; that Settles “is
responsible for the operation of BCCX”; and that Kidd,
Chief of Security at the Davidson County jail, created a
policy allowing the staff to violate the fourteenth Amendment
due process . . . and 13th Amendment.”
(Id. at 16).