United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF
APPELLATE FILING FEE
THOMAS ANDERSON CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
October 28, 2016, Plaintiff Kendrick Dejuan Watson
(“Watson”), who at the time was a pre-trial
detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex in
Memphis, Tennessee, filed pro se a Complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accompanied by a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2). On
November 21, 2016, the Court granted Watson leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).
(ECF No. 6.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as the
City of Memphis,  Memphis Police Department
(“MPD”) Detective William Acred, MDP Detective
Jonathan Overly, States Attorney Paul Haggarman, Defense
Attorney Robert Parrish, and Criminal Court Judge Lee V.
Coffee of the Thirtieth Judicial District, Division 7.
February 20, 2014, a grand jury in Shelby County, Tennessee,
returned indictments against Watson in three separate cases.
See http://jssi.shelbycountytn.gov. Indictment no.
14-00909 charged Watson with especially aggravated robbery,
especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and
conspiracy to commit especially aggravated kidnapping.
(Id.) Indictment no. 14-00910 charged Watson with
being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm.
(Id.) Indictment no. 14-00911 charged Watson with
one count of conspiracy to unlawfully possess a controlled
substance with the intent to sell marijuana, one count of
conspiracy to unlawfully possess a controlled substance with
the intent to sell cocaine, and one count of money
laundering. (Id.) On July 26, 2017, Watson pled
guilty to aggravated assault in No. 14-00909, being a
convicted felon in possession of a firearm in No. 14-00910,
and conspiring to unlawfully possess a controlled substance
with the intent to sell marijuana in No. 14-00911.
Complaint, Watson alleges that in the course of their
investigation into Watson's activities, both Defendants
Det. Overly and Det. Acred used illegally gathered evidence
in order to obtain a wiretap. (Compl. at 2, ECF No. 1.)
According to Watson, on November 1, 2013, Defendant Det.
Overly made an affidavit in support of an application for a
wire tap. (Id.) Det. Overly's affidavit stated
that he had received a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) from
Orion Federal Credit Union. (Id.) Watson claims that
his attorney was told that the SAR would be submitted to him
first, and only after counsel was made aware of it would the
SAR go to the FicCEN (Financial Crimes Enforcement Network).
(Id. at 2-3.) The Complaint does not allege who gave
Watson's attorney this assurance, though it appears it
was the fraud prevention manager at the credit union. The
Complaint goes on to allege that the fraud prevention manager
at the credit union informed Watson's attorney that the
credit union was prohibited by law from disclosing the
existence of a SAR to MPD. (Id. at 3.) Watson
alleges that Det. Overly's warrant affidavit cited the
SAR as part of the warrant application but did not disclose
to the judge that MPD was not supposed to possess or even
know the SAR existed. (Id.)
further alleges that Det. Overly's affidavit falsely
stated that Watson had texted a photo of Det. Acred's
license plate to several of Watson's associates to avoid
or interfere with the police surveillance. (Id.)
Watson now contends that his girlfriend texted a picture and
that the detectives could not have known this information
without illegally monitoring Watson's phone.
(Id. at 3-4.) As relief, Watson seeks compensatory
damages from the City of Memphis. (Id. at 5).
Amended Complaint, Watson alleges that Defendant Haggarman
knew that MPD falsified information and used illegal
information to obtain the wiretap and pursued the prosecution
against Watson anyway. (Amended Compl. at 1, ECF No. 7.)
According to Watson, Judge Coffee also knew that MPD had
acted improperly; however, he allowed the case to proceed and
denied Watson's motion to suppress. (Id.) Watson
questions the effectiveness of Defendant Parrish's
representation and alleges that he has filed a bar complaint
against Parrish. (Id. at 1-2.)
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the Complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) pleading standards
announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79
(2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true, the Court
‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint
to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . .
are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the
assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the
framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2)
still requires a ‘showing, ' rather than a blanket
assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual
allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant
could satisfy the requirement of providing not only
‘fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also
‘grounds' on which the claim rests.”).
complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any
complaint that is legally frivolous would ipso facto
fail to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 470 ...