United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Knoxville
L. REEVES CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
inmate Travis Miles has filed a motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Respondent has filed a response in opposition to the
petition. Having considered the pleadings and the record,
along with the relevant law, the Court finds that it is
unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing, and Miles'
§ 2255 motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2014, Miles pleaded guilty and was convicted of possessing a
firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
[See Doc. 15 in No. 3:14-CR-100]. Based on his prior
convictions, which included three burglaries and one
aggravated burglary, Miles was deemed an armed career
criminal [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 20, 28, 34, 37, 39, 59 in No.
3:14-CR-100]. At sentencing, this Court imposed the
statutorily-mandated minimum sentence of 180 months'
imprisonment [Doc. 22 in No. 3:14-CR-100]. Miles did not
appeal. On June 14, 2016, with the assistance of counsel,
Miles filed the instant § 2255 motion, alleging that his
status as an armed career criminal is no longer valid after
the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States, which invalidated the residual clause of the
Armed Career Criminal Act “(ACCA”) [Doc. 1].
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The
United States was ordered to respond to Miles'
allegations, and it complied with the order by filing a
response in opposition to the motion on July 18, 2016 [Doc.
defendant has been convicted and exhausted his appeal rights,
a court may presume that “he stands fairly and finally
convicted.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 164 (1982). A court may grant relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, but the statute “does not encompass all
claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.”
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185
(1979). Rather, collateral attack limits a movant's
allegations to those of constitutional or jurisdictional
magnitude, or those containing factual or legal errors
“so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding
invalid.” Short v. United States, 471 F.3d
686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT STANDARDS
ACCA requires a 15-year minimum sentence for a felon who
unlawfully possesses a firearm after having sustained three
prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious
drug offense, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The
statute defines a “violent felony” as “any
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” that (1) “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another” (the “use-of-force
clause”); (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives” (the
“enumerated-offense clause”); or (3)
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”) (the
“residual clause”). 18 U.S.C. §
Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court struck
down the residual clause of the ACCA as unconstitutionally
vague and violative of due process. Johnson, 135
S.Ct. at 2563. However, Johnson did not invalidate
“the remainder of the Act's definition of a violent
felony.” Id. Therefore, for a § 2255
petitioner to obtain relief under Johnson, he must
show that his ACCA-enhanced sentence was necessarily based on
a predicate violent felony that only qualified as such under
the residual clause. See, e.g., Potter v. United
States, 887 F.3d 785, 788 (6th Cir. 6018). Accordingly,
post-Johnson, a defendant can properly receive an
ACCA-enhanced sentence based either on the statute's
use-of-force or enumerated-offense clauses. United States
v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2015); see
also United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701, 719 (6th
Cir. 2015) (affirming ACCA sentence where prior convictions
qualified under use-of-force and enumerated-offense clauses).
evaluating whether a conviction qualifies as a predicate
offense under the ACCA's enumerated-offense clause,
courts apply the “categorical approach, ” which
requires the reviewing court to compare the elements of the
statute of conviction with the “generic elements”
of the offense. Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct.
2243, 2248 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570
U.S. 254, 257 (2013). If the statute of conviction is broader
than that criminalizing the generic offense, then it cannot
qualify as a violent felony, regardless of the facts
comprising the offense. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S.Ct.
claims that his aggravated burglary and burglary convictions
are no longer ACCA predicates after Johnson, as they
only qualify as “violent felonies” under the
now-void residual clause [See Doc. 1 p.2]. As noted
above, a burglary offense constitutes a predicate offense for
purposes of the enumerated-offense clause of the ACCA when
the offense's statutory definition substantially
corresponds to the “generic” definition of
burglary, which the Supreme Court has defined as “any
crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having
the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or
remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit
a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575, 599 (1990).
Tennessee burglary statute under which Miles was convicted
provides that an individual commits burglary when,
“without the effective consent of the property owner,
(1) Enters a building other than a habitation (or any portion
thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a