United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
S. MATTICE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
inmate William Wayne Martin has filed a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Respondent has filed a response in opposition to the motion,
and Martin has filed a reply thereto. Having considered the
pleadings and the record, along with the relevant law, the
Court finds that it is unnecessary to hold an evidentiary
hearing, and Martin's § 2255 motion will
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
pleaded guilty and was convicted of possessing a firearm and
ammunition as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
[Doc. 23 in No. 1:11-CR-69]. Based on his prior Tennessee
convictions - including six convictions for burglary and one
conviction for aggravated assault - Martin was deemed an
armed career criminal [Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”) ¶¶ 22, 53, 55-57 in No.
1:11-CR-69]. The Court sentenced him to the statutory
mandatory minimum of 180 months' imprisonment [Doc. 23 in
No. 1:11-CR-69]. Martin did not appeal.
about June 20, 2016, Martin filed the instant § 2255
motion, alleging that his status as an armed career criminal
is no longer valid after the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. United States, which invalidated the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
“(ACCA”) [Doc. 1]. Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The United States was
ordered to respond to Martin's allegations, and it
complied with the order by filing a response in opposition to
the motion on August 19, 2016 [Doc. 5]. Thereafter, Martin
filed a reply to the United States' response [Doc. 6].
defendant has been convicted and exhausted his appeal rights,
a court may presume that “he stands fairly and finally
convicted.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 164 (1982). A court may grant relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, but the statute “does not encompass all
claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.”
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185
(1979). Rather, collateral attack limits a movant's
allegations to those of constitutional or jurisdictional
magnitude, or those containing factual or legal errors
“so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding
invalid.” Short v. United States, 471 F.3d
686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
ACCA requires a 15-year minimum sentence for a felon who
unlawfully possesses a firearm after having sustained three
prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious
drug offense, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The
statute defines a “violent felony” as “any
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” that (1) “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another” (the “use-of-force
clause”); (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives” (the
“enumerated-offense clause”); or (3)
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”) (the
“residual clause”). 18 U.S.C. §
Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court struck
down the residual clause of the ACCA as unconstitutionally
vague and violative of due process. Johnson, 135
S.Ct. at 2563. However, Johnson did not invalidate
“the remainder of the Act's definition of a violent
felony.” Id. Therefore, for a § 2255
petitioner to obtain relief under Johnson, he must
show that his ACCA-enhanced sentence was necessarily based on
a predicate violent felony that only qualified as such under
the residual clause. See, e.g., Potter v. United
States, 887 F.3d 785, 788 (6th Cir. 6018). Accordingly,
post-Johnson, a defendant can properly receive an
ACCA-enhanced sentence based either on the statute's
use-of-force or enumerated-offense clauses. United States
v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2015); see
also United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701, 719 (6th
Cir. 2015) (affirming ACCA sentence where prior convictions
qualified under use-of-force and enumerated-offense clauses).
evaluating whether a conviction qualifies as a predicate
offense under the ACCA's enumerated-offense clause,
courts apply the “categorical approach, ” which
requires the reviewing court to compare the elements of the
statute of conviction with the “generic elements”
of the offense. Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct.
2243, 2248 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570
U.S. 254, 257 (2013). If the statute of conviction is broader
than that criminalizing the generic offense, then it cannot
qualify as a violent felony, regardless of the facts
comprising the offense. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S.Ct.
the statute of conviction is “divisible, ” in
that it lists elements in the alternative to define several
different variants of the crime, courts may employ the
“modified categorical approach” in order to
evaluate which of the alternative elements constituted the
offense of conviction. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S.Ct.
at 2249. When considering whether the conviction qualifies as
an ACCA predicate under this approach, courts may review a
limited set of documents (referred to as Shepard
documents) to determine the elements of the crime of
conviction and compare that crime to the generic offense.
See id.; see also Shepard v. United States, 125
S.Ct. 1254 (2005).
time Martin was convicted of aggravated assault, Tennessee
law held that a person commits aggravated ...