United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH,
DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS, AND GRANTING LEAVE
L. PARKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Brian Vaughn, an inmate at the Shelby County Criminal Justice
Center (“SCCJC”) in Memphis, Tennessee, sued pro
se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and moved to proceed in forma
pauperis. (Complaint (“Comp.”) ECF No. 1; Motion,
ECF No. 2.) The Court granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and assessed the civil filing fee under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b). (Order, ECF No. 5.) The Clerk is
ORDERED to record the defendants as the State of Tennessee;
Bill Oldham, Sheriff of Shelby County; Corrections
Officer (“C/O”) First Name Unknown
(“FNU”) Perkins; and Sergeant FNU Bunnet.
alleges that another inmate protested the lack of attention
from guards by throwing bags of feces and urine out of his
security flap. (Comp., ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)
Plaintiff's face and clothes were covered in the waste.
(Id.) Officers refused to supply him a change of
clothes or provide medical attention. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that officers only allowed him to shower and forced
him to wash his clothes with hand soap in his sink.
(Id.) He reported the issue and was moved to a
different pod. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks unspecified
compensatory damages. (Id. at PageID 3.)
Screening Requirements Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Court must screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any
complaint, or any portion of it, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
Court first determines whether the complaint states a claim
for relief by applying the standards under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). With that in mind, the Court
accepts the complaint's “well-pleaded”
factual allegations as true and then determines whether the
allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 681 (2009)). Of note, conclusory allegations “are
not entitled to the assumption of truth” because they
are not “factual” and legal conclusions
“must be supported by factual allegations.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 also provides guidance on this issue.
rule requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007). But it also requires factual
allegations to make a “‘showing,' rather than
a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
conducting the screening analysis accord slightly more
deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted by
lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally
construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir.
2004)). That said, pro se litigants are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint
for failure to comply with “unique pleading
requirements” and stating “a court cannot
‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out
in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
Requirements to State a Claim Under 42 ...