United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
A. VARLAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
civil action is before the Court on defendant's pro
se motion for reconsideration [Doc. 259]. In this
motion, defendant requests reconsideration of the Court's
December 12, 2017, order [Doc. 257] denying defendant's
pro se motion for ruling on an alleged outstanding
motion [Doc. 256]. In the motion for ruling on the
outstanding motion [Doc. 256], defendant claims that this
Court failed to rule on a request for an evidentiary hearing
on alleged prosecutorial misconduct in its order denying
defendant's request for a new trial [Doc. 199].
Court did, in fact, consider and deny defendant's request
for an evidentiary hearing on prosecutorial misconduct
[See id.]. When defendant moved for a ruling on the
“outstanding motion, ” this Court then reaffirmed
its previous consideration and subsequent denial of the
defendant's request [See Doc. 257]. Defendant
now, yet again, asks this Court to consider his previous
requests for an evidentiary hearing on prosecutorial
misconduct, which the Court will, yet again, deny. The Court
will now articulate, for a third time, why defendant's
request for an evidentiary hearing on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct will be denied.
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a
motion to reconsider, courts ruling on motions to reconsider
ordinarily evaluate such motions under the same standards
that govern a civil motion to alter or amend a judgment under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), a
motion for reconsideration is generally appropriate when
there has been an intervening change of controlling law,
previously unavailable evidence has become available, or it
is necessary to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest justice. United States v. Titterington, No.
CR.2-20165, 2003 WL 23924932, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 22,
2003). A motion to reconsider should not be used as an
opportunity to rehash the same arguments presented in the
original motion. Helton v. ACS Grp., 964 F.Supp.
1175, 1182 (E.D. Tenn. 1997).
herein has presented no change of controlling law, no newly
available evidence, and no clear error of law or manifest
injustice. Instead, he has restated his arguments from his
original motion for a new trial and evidentiary hearing [Doc.
169]. These arguments have included that the prosecution
knowingly used perjured testimony, concealed the possibility
of a third perpetrator, and included improper statements
lending credibility to a witness during closing argument
[Doc. 259]. This Court addressed each of these allegations
both in its order denying the defendant's motion for a
new trial [Doc. 169] and in its order denying his motion for
ruling on the purported outstanding motion [Doc. 256].
defendant's present motion, he makes the same arguments
concerning the perjured statements and concealed third
perpetrator as he did in his previous motions [See
Docs. 169, 256]. Yet, he claims this Court has
“overlooked” the alleged perjured statements from
Agent Blanton, Trooper Reynolds, and Brian Witham at the June
2, 2016, evidentiary hearing and again at the trial that took
place from January 31, 2017, to February 14, 2017
[Id.]. Despite defendant's claim that this Court
“overlooked” his claims of perjured testimony,
this Court previously addressed and dismissed these claims
[Doc. 199]. The statements made by Agent Blanton and Trooper
Reynolds related to the alleged false statements in the
search warrant affidavit. Specifically, both the evidentiary
hearing statements and affidavit statements had to do with
the GPS technology. As this Court has already noted,
defendant has only presented minor inconsistencies in the
description of GPS points [Id. p. 6]. Defendant
provides no evidence that these differing statements were
made intentionally or recklessly [Id.].
also cites other alleged perjured statements by Agent Blanton
at the June 2, 2016, evidentiary hearing. Other than
conclusory statements, claiming “there was no evidence,
” defendant has failed to show how Agent Blanton
perjured himself [Doc. 169 p. 15]. His main
complaint is that the agent and prosecution referred to
defendant and Brian Witham as a single unit. Defendant
provides no evidence to counter the prosecution's
characterization of the defendant and Brian Witham as a team.
In fact, his original motion for a new trial and evidentiary
hearing on prosecutorial misconduct is a series of
allegations without any support.
provides no support for other allegations of perjured
statements. He claims Brian Witham perjured himself because
his testimony deviated from the testimony of victims
[Id. p. 11]. However, he does not explain why the
victims' perceptions necessarily rendered Witham's
statements false. Additionally, even if these statements were
false, it would not have materially affected the outcome of
the trial. To establish a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
“the defendant must show that the statement in question
was false, that the prosecution knew it was false, and that
it was material.” Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d
486, 517 (6th Cir. 2000). Defendant has failed to show how
the alleged false statements were intentional or material.
defendant reiterates his argument regarding the
prosecution's concealment of a third perpetrator.
Defendant claims that the prosecution's failure to indict
a third perpetrator aided the prosecution's theory that
defendant and Brian Witham acted as a “single
unit” [See Doc. 169]. However, there is no
connection between the prosecution's decision not to
indict a third perpetrator and defendant's claim that the
prosecution employed an “entity device” in order
to portray the defendant and Brian Witham as a single unit
[Id.]. As this Court has already stated in its order
denying defendant's motion for a new trial and
evidentiary hearing, a decision whether to prosecute rests in
the prosecutor's discretion. See United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979).
defendant has failed to show how the prosecution's
decision not to indict a third person materially affected his
trial. To do so, defendant must show that the undisclosed
fact would have created a “reasonable
probability” of a different result. Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Whether there is a
reasonable probability of a different result depends on
whether, in the absence of the undisclosed fact, the
defendant received a fair trial. Id. Additionally,
“[t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed
information might have helped the defense, or might have
affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish
“materiality” in the constitutional sense.”
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976).
Defendant has not provided any evidence or argument as to how
the existence of a third perpetrator would make it reasonably
probable that there would be a different result. In any
event, even if the existence of a third, unindicted suspect
would have materially affected the outcome of this trial, the
prosecution did not hide that fact from defendant or the
jury. As this Court has already articulated, “the
government did not ignore the potential presence or
participation of other individuals in the criminal enterprise
either at trial or in its filings with the Court” [Doc.
defendant has failed to provide any reason for the Court to
reconsider its order denying his motion for an evidentiary
hearing. He has provided no intervening change of controlling
law, no new evidence, and no reason why there has been a
clear error of law or manifest injustice. Instead, he has
only reiterated his original arguments for the third time.
the Court finds no basis on which to reconsider its prior
ruling [Doc. 257] on defendant's motion to rule on an
“outstanding motion.” Defendant's motion for
reconsideration [Doc. 259] is therefore
DENIED. Defendant's motion ...