United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
A. Trauger, United States District Court Judge.
William Davis, an inmate of the Rutherford County Adult
Detention Center in Murfreeboro, Tennessee, filed this pro
se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center and
f/n/u Fly. (Doc. No. 1).
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is
frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United
States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiff's factual
allegations as true unless they are entirely without
credibility. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437
(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Although pro se
pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se
complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded]
allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges
“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under
Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements:
(1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d
543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v.
City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533
(6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint alleges that the plaintiff is a state and federal
inmate confined at a county jail. According to the complaint,
the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center where the
plaintiff is incarcerated does not offer the same
rehabilitative and work programs as Tennessee state prisons,
nor does it offer the same opportunity for inmates to earn
good time credits. The complaint also alleges that the
plaintiff has “ZERO access to parole mandated programs
such as CMS, therapeutic communities, or pro-social life
skills.” (Doc. No. 1 at 5).
addition, the complaint alleges that the plaintiff is
required to pay a portion of his medical treatment and
medication costs. The plaintiff believes that, “[i]f
[he] were in a TDOC prison, [his] medical care would be
provided for little to no cost.” (Id.)
complaint names two defendants this to action: the Rutherford
County Adult Detention Center and Deputy Chief f/n/u Fly.
(Doc. No. 1 at 4).
respect to the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center, a
jail is not a “person” that can be sued under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Cf. Fuller v. Cocran, No.
1:05-CV-76, 2005 WL 1802415, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. July 27, 2005)
(dismissing § 1983 claims against the Bradley County
Justice Center on the same basis); Seals v. Grainger
County Jail, No. 3:04CV606, 2005 WL 1076326, at *1 (E.D.
Tenn. May 6, 2005) (“The Grainger County Jail, however,
is not a suable entity within the meaning of §
1983.”). Thus, the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which ...