United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
AND DENYING MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (ECF No. 7)
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
August 10, 2018, Plaintiff Nichole Turner, who is currently
in custody at the Obion County Jail in Union City, Tennessee,
filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The complaint concerns
Turner's previous incarceration at the Madison County
Criminal Justice Complex in Jackson, Tennessee. The Court
issued an order on August 13, 2018, granting leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall
record the Defendants as the Madison County Criminal Justice
Complex (CJC), Correctional Officer (C/O) First Name Unknown
(FNU) Mayberry, C/O FNU Scheupp, and C/O FNU Summer.
entire allegations are as follows:
1. On April 20 at apox [sic] 8:30 am Off. Mayberry opened up
booking Cell door and violated my Eighth Amendment Rights by
not following institutional procedure placing his hands on me
pulling me into the Cell and assulting [sic] me.
2. On April 21 at apox [sic] 5:00am in unit A114 Cell A115
Off. Scheupp open up my Cell door and violated my Eighth
Amendment Rights by not following institutional procedure
entering my Cell and maseing [sic] me.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Turner seeks “Restitution in
the amount of twenty million dollars.” (Id. at
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975))).
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party ...