United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
HENRY A. WILLIAMS, Movant,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Movant Henry A. Williams' Motion Under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence
by a Person in Federal Custody. (ECF No. 1.)
following reasons, Williams' motion under § 2255 is
DENIED AS MOOT.
convicted Williams of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
(See Jury Verdict, United States v.
Williams, No. 2:04-cr-20401 (W.D. Tenn. 2005), ECF No.
57.) The Court found that the Armed Career Criminal Act (the
“ACCA”) applied to Williams based on his prior
convictions of involuntary manslaughter; four separate
convictions for burglary; escape; attempted burglary; rape;
and robbery. (Presentence Investigation Report ¶¶
26, 29-31, 35-38, 40, No. 2:04-cr-20401.) The Court sentenced
Williams to 180 months of incarceration and three years of
supervised release. (Judgment, No. 2:04-cr-20401, ECF No.
2008, Williams filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. (Williams v. United States, No.
2:08-cv-02348 (W.D. Tenn. 2009), ECF No. 1.) The Court
dismissed his petition and denied a certificate of
appealability. (Order, No. 2:08-cv-02348, ECF No. 6.) The
Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct
appeal. (Order of USCA, No. 2:04-cr-20401, ECF No. 87.)
2016, Williams sought authorization by the Sixth Circuit to
file a second or successive § 2255 petition, challenging
his ACCA designation in light of Johnson v. United
States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). (Second Successive Mots.,
Williams v. United States, No. 16-5827 (6th Cir.
2016), ECF Nos. 1, 8.) In September 2016, the Sixth Circuit
granted his motion and transferred the case to this Court.
(Order, 6th Cir. No. 16-5827, ECF No. 12.) In this §
2255 motion, Williams argues that his sentence was improperly
enhanced under the ACCA because his prior convictions for
robbery and burglary were determined to be qualifying
offenses under the ACCA's now-invalidated residual
clause. (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Williams was released from custody
on February 2, 2018.
has been released from the physical custody of the BOP. His
§ 2255 motion “regarding lowering his term of
imprisonment [in light of Johnson] has been rendered
moot with his release from BOP custody.” United
States v. Hinson, No. 2:02-cr-22, 2015 WL 5712767, at *4
(E.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 2015); see also Demis v.
Sniezek, 558 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“Mootness results when events occur during the
pendency of a litigation which render the court unable to
grant the requested relief.”). Because Williams is not
presently in custody, the Court cannot grant him relief from
is “still ‘in custody' for purposes of §
2255 because he is serving a term of supervised
release.” Hinson, 2015 WL 5712767, at *4.
Williams does not argue, however, that his three-year term of
supervised release was imposed in violation of the
Constitution, that the Court was without jurisdiction to
impose it, or that it was in excess of the maximum authorized
by law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Williams'
only claim addresses his custodial sentence enhancement under
the ACCA. (See ECF No. 1 at 3; see also Lukasik
v. United States, No. CIV. 08-10960, 2011 WL 1296852, at
*5 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding that § 2255
petitioner's claims about length of his sentence were
moot because he was released from custody and because he did
not “appear to quarrel with the amount of restitution
or the term of supervised release”).)
three-year term of supervised release does not exceed the
maximum authorized by law. See 18 U.S.C. §
924(a)(2) (providing that whoever violates § 922(g)
shall be imprisoned for no more than ten years); id.
§ 3559(a)(3) (providing that an offense with a maximum
term of ten years is classified as a Class D felony);
id. § 3583(b)(2) (noting that the authorized
term of supervised release for a Class D felony is not more
than three years).
foregoing reasons, Williams' motion under § ...