United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND
T. FOWLKES, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is Defendant Teleflex Medical's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, filed on March 1, 2019.
(ECF No. 10.) Pursuant to Administrative Order 2013-05, this
case, including Defendant's Motion, was referred to the
Magistrate Judge for management of all pretrial matters.
Plaintiff James Lawson, Jr. did not file a response to the
Motion, and accordingly, the Magistrate Judge entered an
Order to Show Cause on April 1, 2019, instructing Plaintiff
to show cause why the Court should not grant Defendant's
Motion based solely on the arguments presented therein. (ECF
No. 11.) Plaintiff did not respond to the Order to Show
Cause. As a result, the Magistrate Judge considered the
arguments presented by Defendant's Motion and entered an
April 22, 2019 Report and Recommendation suggesting that this
Court grant Defendant's Motion and dismiss this case for
Plaintiff's failure to timely file their Complaint or
respond to the Court's Order to Show Cause.
following reasons, the Court finds that the Magistrate's
Report and Recommendation should be ADOPTED and
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss GRANTED.
Magistrate Judge provides facts, which this Court, upon
review, incorporates for purposes of this Motion. The facts
provided by the Magistrate are as follows:
Lawson asserts in his pro se [C]omplaint that he was
previously employed by Teleflex at its facility in Olive
Branch, Mississippi. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3.) He alleges that his
employment was terminated on or about August 24, 2018.
(Id. at 3.) On August 28, 2018, Lawson filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging
Teleflex engaged in sex discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, et seq. (“Title
VII”). (ECF No. 1 at 5; ECF No. 1-1 at 1.) The EEOC
closed its investigation and issued a right to sue notice on
August 31, 2018. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2.) Lawson alleges that he
received the right to sue notice on September 6, 2018. (ECF
No. 1 at 5.) Lawson filed the present complaint in this court
on December 6, 2018. (ECF No. 1.)
(ECF No. 13, 2.)
passed 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) “to relieve some of the
burden on the federal courts by permitting the assignment of
certain district court duties to magistrates.”
United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir.
2001). Pursuant to the provision, magistrate judges may hear
and determine any pretrial matter pending before the Court,
except various dispositive motions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A). Regarding those excepted dispositive motions,
magistrate judges may still hear and submit to the district
court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for
disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Upon hearing a
pending matter, “[T]he magistrate judge must enter a
recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed
findings of fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(1); see also
Baker v. Peterson, 67 Fed.Appx. 308, 310 (6th Cir.
2003). Any party who disagrees with a magistrate's
proposed findings and recommendation may file written
objections to the report and recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P.
standard of review that is applied by the district court
depends on the nature of the matter considered by the
magistrate judge. See Baker, 67 Fed.Appx. at 310
(citations omitted) (“A district court normally applies
a ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law' standard
of review for nondispositive preliminary measures. A district
court must review dispositive motions under the de
novo standard.”). Upon review of the evidence, the
district court may accept, reject, or modify the proposed
findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 47 F.Supp.3d 665, 674 (W.D.
Tenn. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The court “may also receive further evidence or
recommit the matter to the [m]agistrate [j]udge with
instructions.” Moses v. Gardner, No.
2:14-cv-2706-SHL-dkv, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29701, at *3
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2015). A district judge should adopt the
findings and rulings of the magistrate judge to which no
specific objection is filed. Brown, 47 F.Supp.3d at
674. Moreover, “Overly general objections do not
satisfy the objection requirement.” Spencer v.
Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006). Objections
“must be clear enough to enable the district court to
discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious.” Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636,
637 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, objections disputing the
correctness of the magistrate's recommendation but
failing to specify the findings believed to be in error are
too general. See Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380
(6th Cir. 1995).
Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint should be granted as a result of
Plaintiff's failure to timely file his Complaint or
respond to the Court's Order to Show Cause. “As a
prerequisite to bringing suit under Title VII, a claimant
must exhaust his or her administrative remedies.”
Scott v. Eastman Chem. Co., 275 Fed.Appx. 466, 470
(6th Cir. 2008). “Before a plaintiff alleging
discrimination under Title VII can bring suit in federal
court, she must satisfy two administrative prerequisites:
“(1) [f]iling timely charges of employment
discrimination with the EEOC, and (2) receiving and acting
upon the EEOC's statutory notices of the right to
sue.” Nichols v. Muskingum Coll., 318 F.3d
674, 677 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Puckett v. Tenn. Eastman
Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir. 1989)). “An
employment discrimination suit under Title VII must be filed
within ninety days of Plaintiff s receipt of a right to sue
letter from the EEOC.” Williams v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 143 F.Supp.2d 941, 944 (W.D. Tenn. 2011);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
“Failure to bring suit within the prescribed
ninety[-]day limit is grounds for dismissal[, ]” which
federal courts have strictly enforced. Williams, 143
F.Supp.2d at 944; id. at 945 (noting that even one
day's delay is fatal to such a claim). “‘If
the undisputed facts, and/or the record evidence viewed most
favorable for the plaintiff, demonstrates [sic] as a matter
of law that the plaintiff commenced h[is] lawsuit beyond the
ambit of limitations, in the absence of a waiver, estoppel,
or compelling justification or excuse which tolled
limitations . . ., a summary dismissal of the complaint
should be sustained.'” Id. (quoting
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,
on the record, the EEOC mailed the right-to-sue letter on
August 31, 2018. (ECF No. 1-1, 2.) Notably, “The Sixth
Circuit has resolved that notice is given, and hence the
ninety-day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day
following the EEOC's mailing of [a right-to-sue]
notification to the claimant's record residential
address, by virtue of a presumption of actual delivery and
receipt within that five-day duration, unless the plaintiff
rebuts that presumption with proof that he or she did not
receive notification within that period.”
Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art,
Inc.,209 F.3d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
omitted) (footnote omitted). Plaintiff states that he
received the right to sue notice on September 6, 2018. (ECF
No. 1, 5.) Accordingly, as noted by the Magistrate, Plaintiff
was required to file his Complaint on or before December 5,
2018. (ECF No. 13, 3.) Plaintiff, however, did not file his
Complaint until December 6, 2018. (ECF No. 1.) Although the
Complaint is merely one (1) day late, Court's routinely
hold that a failure to file a complaint upon receiving a
right to sue letter from the EEOC within the prescribed
ninety-day period, even if only one (1) day late, is grounds
for dismissal of the Complaint. Williams, 143
F.Supp.2d at 945; see also Peterson v. Hopson, No.
17-2891-JPM-dkv, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158058, at *7- 8 (W.D.
Tenn. Aug. 24, 2018) (dismissing pro se
plaintiff's Title VII claims where ninety-day period had
expired); Simns v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc.,
Nos. 11-1052, 12-1016, 12-2026, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14424,
at *14 ...