United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
September 7, 2018, Plaintiff Daniel Pugliese, who is
incarcerated at the Northwest Correctional Complex (NWCX) in
Tiptonville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee. (ECF No. 1.) After
Pugliese filed the required financial information, (ECF Nos.
4 & 5), U.S. District Judge William J. Campbell issued an
order on September 27, 2018, granting leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, assessing the civil filing fee pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(a)-(b), and transferring Pugliese's
compliant to this district. (ECF No. 6.) On October 19, 2018,
Pugliese filed an amended complaint, which appears to
supplement, rather than supersede, his original complaint.
(ECF No. 10.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as Tony
Parker, Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC)
Commissioner; Dr. First Name Unknown (FNU) Conway; Centurion
Medical Corporation; Christi Gregory, Medical Director; and
alleges that Commissioner Parker has, on several occasions,
refused his request to be housed at “DSNF hospital
unit” for his “severe muscle loss, deformed
knees, partial blindness, ” and other medical
issues. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) He alleges that
Defendant Parker “should have housed me at DSNF, long
ago.” (Id. at PageID 1-2.) Pugliese asserts
that he is instead still at the NWCX, where Defendant Gregory
refuses him “medical help, ” including
“[E]nsure for muscle loss, ” “a wheelchair,
” “vitamins, ” “help for muscle loss,
” and medication for his “anemic condition”
and for glaucoma. (Id. at PageID 2.) Pugliese
insists Defendant Gregory refuses him treatment and
medication because Pugliese is a “mental patient”
and “medical hates mental patients.”
(Id.) Pugliese alleges that Centurion and Dr. Conway
also “refuse to get me help for these issues, and they
were notified many times about it.” (Id.)
amended complaint, Pugliese names only the NWCX as a
Defendant and alleges that on October 6, 2018, he made a
medical complaint about pain in his left shoulder, right
bicep, and right hip. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 6-7.) He alleges
that “the medical staff” is inadequate and
incorrectly told him nothing was wrong. (Id. at
asserts his claims against the Defendants in their official
and individual capacities. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He seeks
$10 million in damages and requests that the Defendants be
fired from their positions. (Id. at PageID 3.)
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975))).
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state ...