United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga
L. COLLIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
inmate Raymond Cartwright has filed a motion and supplemental
motions to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255. Respondent has filed a response in
opposition to the motions, and Cartwright has replied. Having
considered the pleadings and the record, along with the
relevant law, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to hold
an evidentiary hearing in this matter, and the motion will be
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
convicted Cartwright of possessing a firearm and ammunition
as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
See United States v. Cartwright, 221 Fed.Appx. 438,
439-40 (6th Cir. 2007). Based on his prior Tennessee
convictions for first-degree burglary, second-degree
burglary, third-degree burglary, felonious escape, aggravated
assault, and incest, he was deemed an armed career criminal
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), and was sentenced to 288 months'
imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release
[Doc. 79 in No. 1:04-CR-33; Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”) at ¶¶ 33, 38, 40, 42-43, 44-45,
and 53]. See also Cartwright, 221 Fed.Appx. at
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
Cartwright's conviction and sentence on direct appeal.
Id. at 442. On December 10, 2007, the Supreme Court
denied Cartwright's request for a writ of certiorari.
Cartwright v. United States, 552 U.S. 1083 (2007).
April 2008, Cartwright filed a § 2255 motion, which was
denied as without merit in December of 2011 [See
Doc. 172 in No. 1:04-CR-33]. In October of 2016, the Sixth
Circuit authorized Cartwright to file a successive §
2255 motion challenging his armed-career criminal
classification in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015),
which invalidated the residual clause of the ACCA as
unconstitutionally vague [Docs. 189 and 193]. Multiple
motions to amend and/or supplement the § 2255 motion
have been filed and remain pending, but the United States has
responded to the initial motion and first two supplements
[See Docs. 3, 4, 6, and 13]. Cartwright has filed
replies to the Government's responses [See Docs.
5 and 14], and Cartwright has submitted a subsequent motion
to amend and/or revise his petition, along with an order to
show cause why he should not immediately be released [Docs.
15 and 17].
the course of this litigation, this action was stayed pending
the outcome of the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Cradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659 (6th Cir.
2018) [Doc. 202 and 204 in No. 1:04-CR-33]. Cradler
having been decided, the Court finds the stay should be
vacated and that these matters reviewed.
defendant has been convicted and exhausted his appeal rights,
a court may presume that “he stands fairly and finally
convicted.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 164 (1982). A court may grant relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, but the statute “does not encompass all
claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.”
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185
(1979). Rather, collateral attack limits a movant's
allegations to those of constitutional or jurisdictional
magnitude, or those containing factual or legal errors
“so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding
invalid.” Short v. United States, 471 F.3d
686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
ACCA requires a fifteen-year minimum sentence for a felon who
unlawfully possesses a firearm after having sustained three
prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious
drug offense, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The
statute defines a “violent felony” as “any
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year” that (1) “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another” (the “use-of-force
clause”); (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives” (the
“enumerated-offense clause”); or (3)
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another”) (the
“residual clause”). 18 U.S.C. §
Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court struck
down the residual clause of the ACCA as unconstitutionally
vague and violative of due process. Johnson, 135
S.Ct. at 2563. However, Johnson did not invalidate
“the remainder of the Act's definition of a violent
felony.” Id. Therefore, for a § 2255
petitioner to obtain relief under Johnson, he must
show that his ACCA-enhanced sentence was necessarily based on
a predicate violent felony that only qualified as such under
the residual clause. See, e.g., Potter v. United
States, 887 F.3d 785, 788 (6th Cir. 6018). Accordingly,
post-Johnson, a defendant can properly receive an
ACCA-enhanced sentence based either on the statute's
use-of-force or enumerated-offense clauses. United States
v. Priddy, 808 F.3d 676, 683 (6th Cir. 2015); see
also United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d 701, 719 (6th
Cir. 2015) (affirming ACCA sentence where prior convictions
qualified under use-of-force and enumerated-offense clauses).
evaluating whether a conviction qualifies as a predicate
offense under the ACCA's enumerated-offense clause,
courts apply a “categorical approach, ” which
requires the reviewing court to compare the elements of the
statute of conviction with the “generic elements”
of the offense. Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct.
2243, 2248 (2016); Descamps v. United States, 570
U.S. 254, 257 (2013). If the statute of conviction is broader
than that criminalizing the generic offense, then it cannot
qualify as a violent felony, regardless of the facts
comprising the offense. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S.Ct.
the statute of conviction is “divisible, ” in
that it lists elements in the alternative to define several
different variants of the crime, courts may employ a
“modified categorical approach” in order to
evaluate which of the alternative elements constituted the
offense of conviction. See, e.g., Mathis, 136 S.Ct.
at 2249. When considering whether the conviction qualifies as
an ACCA predicate under this approach, courts may review a
limited set of documents (referred to as Shepard
documents) to determine the ...