United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga
S. MATTICE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
inmate Dameon Byrd has filed a motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Respondent has filed a response in opposition to the motion.
Having considered the pleadings and the record, along with
the relevant law, the Court finds that there is no necessity
for an evidentiary hearing, and Byrd's § 2255 motion will
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
March 2014, Byrd pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), and possessing a firearm and ammunition
as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) [Doc.
42 in 1:13-CR-50]. Byrd had a prior Tennessee conviction for
aggravated burglary, which was classified as a “crime
of violence” and subjected Byrd to an enhanced offense
level of 20 under United States Sentencing Guideline
(“Guideline(s)”) § 2K2.1 [Doc. 32
¶¶ 22, 48 in 1:13-CR-50]. After a four-level
enhancement because the firearm had an obliterated serial
number, a four-level enhancement because Byrd possessed the
firearm in connection with his drug distribution offense, and
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
Byrd's total offense level was 25 [Id. at
¶¶ 23-24, 32-34]. Byrd's 18 criminal history
points yielded a criminal history category of VI and a
Guideline range of 110 to 137 months' imprisonment
[Id. at ¶¶ 53, 74]. The Court sentenced
Byrd to 130 months' imprisonment [Doc. 42 in 1:13-CR-50].
did not appeal his conviction or sentence. In 2016, Byrd
filed a § 2255 motion that he later sought to
voluntarily dismiss [Docs. 46, 53 in 1:13-CR-50]. The Court
dismissed that action without prejudice [Doc. 54 in
in June 2017, Byrd filed the instant § 2255 motion
alleging that his Tennessee aggravated burglary conviction is
not a “crime of violence” after the Supreme
Court's decision in Mathis v. United States, 136
S.Ct. 2243 (2016) [Docs. 1 & 2], and thus, he should not
have been subject to the § 2K2.1 enhancement. The United
States was ordered to respond to Byrd's allegations, and
it did so by filing its response on March 11, 2019, arguing
that the motion is untimely and otherwise without merit [Doc.
defendant has been convicted and exhausted his appeal rights,
a court may presume that “he stands fairly and finally
convicted.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 164 (1982). A court may grant relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, but the statute “does not encompass all
claimed errors in conviction and sentencing.”
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185
(1979). Rather, collateral attack limits a movant's
allegations to those of constitutional or jurisdictional
magnitude, or those containing factual or legal errors
“so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding
invalid.” Short v. United States, 471 F.3d
686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A one-year limitation period applies to § 2255 motions,
and it runs from the latest of:
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
created by governmental action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by such
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively