United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH AND NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF
APPELLATE FILING FEE
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 6, 2019, Plaintiff Dejuan Darnell Hayes, who is
incarcerated at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center
(Jail) in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The
Court issued an order on August 7, 2019, granting leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil
filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The
Clerk shall record the Defendants as the Memphis Police
Department (MPD) and MPD Officer Nate Lenow.
allegations in Hayes's complaint are sparse. He states:
“Nate Lenow, (1) Use of excessive force, (2) Tampering
of evidence, (3) Pain and suffering, (4) Assault, all of
which happen on the date of September 24, 2017 at 201 Poplar
intake Memphis, TN 38103 at 8:00-9:00 pm.” (ECF No. 1
at PageID 2.) He seeks money damages and also asks that
Defendant Lenow be reprimanded. (Id. at PageID 3.)
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d
1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
the complaint does not provide any factual details supporting
Hayes's claims, he does specifically allege the events
took place on September 24, 2017. The claims therefore are
untimely. The statute of limitations for a § 1983 action
is the “state statute of limitations applicable to
personal injury actions under the law of the state in which
the § 1983 claim arises.” Eidson v. Tenn.
Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634
(6th Cir. 2007); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 275-76 (1985). The limitations period for § 1983
actions arising in Tennessee is the one-year limitations
provision found in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B).
Roberson v. Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir.
2005). However, the complaint in this case was filed almost
two years after the events occurred. Hayes also concedes he
did not file any grievance that would have tolled the
limitations period. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.)
this reason, the complaint is subject to dismissal in its
entirety for failure to state a ...