Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Isi Chito Lusa Yananta v. State of Indiana

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

August 20, 2019

ISI CHITO LUSA YANANTA AKA WENC AKA WASTEUH MEHERRIN NATION, Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF INDIANA, et al., Defendants.

          REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

          ALISTAIR E. NEWBERN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         To: The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., Chief Judge

         This matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) to dispose or recommend disposition of pretrial motions. (Doc. No. 5.) Several pretrial motions are now pending, including a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by Defendants the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Child Services, Kamary Nunn, Shirley Perez, Nokwakhe Fuyana, Amy Foxworth, Cameron Yages, the Honorable Mark D. Stoner, Marion County Prosecutor's Office, Linda Major the City of Indianapolis, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, Ford Goble, and Matthew Morgan, Charles King, the Marion County Sheriff's Office, John R. Layton, the Marion County Public Defender's Office, Anny Alonso, and Travis Shields.[1] (Doc. No. 50.) Review of that motion has revealed a larger problem underlying Yananta's action; it appears that venue is not proper in this Court.

         Accordingly, on June 6, 2019, the Magistrate Judge issued an order for pro se Plaintiff Isi Chito Lusa Yananta to show cause why this action should not be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (Doc. No. 83.) Yananta has responded. (Doc. No. 87.) Because Yananta has not shown that venue is proper in this District, the Magistrate Judge will recommend that this action be transferred to the Southern District of Indiana.

         I. Factual and Procedural Background

         As the Court has previously stated, this civil rights action stems from events that took place in Indianapolis, Indiana, between January 2018 and January 2019. Pro se Plaintiff Isi Chito Lusa Yananta, alleges that the State of Indiana wrongfully charged him with felony battery in January 2018 and deceived him into signing a no-contact order that prohibited him from seeing his daughter for several months. (Doc. No. 31.) Yananta refused to plead guilty, and the State of Indiana moved to dismiss all charges against him due to a lack of evidence in October 2018. (Id.) Yananta regained temporary custody of his daughter in April 13, 2018, but it was not until January 2019 that he received full legal and physical custody. (Id.) At all times relevant to this action, Yananta was a resident of Tennessee.

         Yananta now alleges that the State of Indiana's wrongful prosecution of him and the resulting separation from his daughter caused him extreme suffering. (Id.) He has sued the Indiana Department of Child Services; the Sheriff's Office of Marion County, Indiana; the Marion County Prosecutor's Office; the Marion County Public Defender's Office; the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department; Woods Bail Bond Service and its employee, Theresa Woods; and various city, county, and state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state-law tort theories. (Id.)

         II. Legal Standard

         The federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, provides that a civil action may be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391; see also Bullock v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 943 F.Supp.2d 52, 57 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that because “Section 1983 contains no special venue provision[, ] . . . the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 apply” (alterations in original) (quoting Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cty. Police Dep't., 91 F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir. 1996))); Garrett v. Warren, No. 2:16-cv-2850, 2016 WL 6905975, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 2, 2016) (explaining that § 1391 controls unless a specific venue statute applies).

         When an action is filed in a court where venue is not appropriate, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) requires that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The Court may consider the propriety of venue sua sponte, especially where, as here, many of the defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Schultz v. Ary, 175 F.Supp.2d 959, 964 (W.D. Mich. 2001); see also Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1980) (explaining that “1406(a) provides the basis for any transfer made for the purpose of avoiding an obstacle to adjudication on the merits in the district court where the action was originally brought” and that such an ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.