United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
QUARTEZ J. GARY, Plaintiff,
GAIL NICHOLS and GEORGE SMITH, Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL
WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH, AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
L. PARKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Quartez J. Gary, who is incarcerated at the Shelby County
Jail in Memphis, Tennessee, sued pro se and moved to proceed
in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 2.) The Court granted
leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the civil
filing fee under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b).
(ECF No. 4.) The Court ORDERS the Clerk to record the
Defendants as Deputy Sheriff Gail Nichols and Deputy Sheriff
alleges that during a state-court appearance, the judge used
“the wrong name” to refer to Plaintiff. (ECF No.
1 at PageID 3.) When the judge asked Plaintiff for his name,
Plaintiff responded “that he was the secured Party
creditor with the Power of attorney in fact and the copyright
and Trademark for the name that he was addressed as and also
that he explicitly reserved all his rights under the Uniform
Commercial Code.” (Id.) The judge cut off
Plaintiff and ordered Deputies Nichols and Smith to remove
Plaintiff from the courtroom. (Id. at PageID 4.)
Plaintiff alleges the Deputies used “brute force”
to remove him, despite his warning “that they were
acting under the color of law against a sovereign Political
Power Holder.” (Id.) Plaintiff accuses them of
assault and asserts that they conspired with the judge
“to deprive him of all his rights.”
(Id.) He also asserts that the judge violated his
right to due process and caused him extreme emotional
distress. (Id. at PageID 5.)
sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) He seeks a court order
“directing the Shelby County Sheriff Office to
implement a disciplinary system to punish those who continue
to engage in” actions like those alleged here and $5
million each in compensatory and punitive damages.
(Id. at PageID 6.)
Screening Requirements Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any
complaint, or any portion of it, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
step one, in assessing whether the complaint states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the
standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79
(2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court
accepts the complaint's “well-pleaded”
factual allegations as true and then determines whether the
allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).
Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth” because they are not
“factual” and legal conclusions “must be
supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. And Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides
guidance on this issue.
though Rule 8 only requires a complaint to contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, ” it also requires
factual allegations to make a “‘showing,'
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
conducting the screening analysis will give slightly more
deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted by
lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally
construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir.
2004)). That said, pro se litigants are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se
complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading
requirements” and stating ...