United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER TO MODIFY THE DOCKET, DISMISSING COMPLAINT,
CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH,
AND DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
L. PARKER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Douzia Tramayne Dowdy, who was a pretrial detainee at the
Shelby County Criminal Justice Center (“SCCJC”)
in Memphis, Tennessee,  sued pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and moved to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1; ECF No.
2.) The Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessed the civil filing fee under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to
record the Defendants as Shelby County Sheriff's Office
(“SCSO”) and the Shelby County Jail
alleges that while he was housed at SCCJC, he was bitten by
“a venomous spider” on his right forearm while he
slept. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) Plaintiff awoke when he was
bitten, killed the spider, and told an on-duty officer about
the spider. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the SCCJC staff
forced him to stay in the same cell where he was bitten
without ever spraying for insects or spiders. (Id.)
SCCJC staff then took Plaintiff for medical treatment four
days later and then again four days after that when, he
alleges, his bite showed signs of infection that worsened.
(Id. at PageID 2-3.) Plaintiff states that the
infection “still hasn't gone away” and he has
had “complications” in his right arm since being
bitten. (Id. at PageID 3.)
seeks unspecified damages “for the pain and suffering I
went through and that I'm still having.”
(Id. at PageID 3.)
Screening Requirements Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any
complaint, or any portion of it, if the complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
that relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
step one, in assessing whether the complaint states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the
standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as
stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79
(2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court
accepts the complaint's “well-pleaded”
factual allegations as true and then determines whether the
allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).
Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the
assumption of truth” because they are not
“factual” and legal conclusions “must be
supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679. Federal Rule also of Civil Procedure 8 also
provides guidance on this issue.
though Rule 8 only requires a complaint to contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, ” it also requires
factual allegations to make a “‘showing,'
rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.
conducting the screening analysis will give slightly more
deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted by
lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to
less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally
construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting
Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir.
2004)). That said, pro se litigants are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint
for failure to comply with “unique pleading
requirements” and stating ...