United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
RICHARD I. PORCH, III, Plaintiff,
QUALITY CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, ET AL., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
AND DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
January 4, 2019, Plaintiff Richard I. Porch, III, who is
incarcerated at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility
(HCCF) in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The
Court issued an order on January 9, 2019, granting leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil
filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The
Clerk shall record the Defendants as Quality Correctional
Health Care, the Madison County Sheriff's Department,
Nurse First Name Unknown (FNU) Franks, Nurse FNU Woods, Nurse
FNU Brewer, Lieutenant FNU Balderamma, Sergeant FNU Long, and
Madison County Sheriff John Mehr.
alleges that he was an inmate at the Madison County Criminal
Justice Complex (CJC) in Jackson, Tennessee, from May 16,
2018, through July 10, 2018, when he was transferred to HCCF.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) He alleges that, during those two
months, he suffered from an inguinal hernia, which
“worsened from a quarter sized bulge in my abdominal
region that was manag[e]able with a hernia belt to a
grapefruit sized mass in my scro[t]um, now requiring surgery
and unretractable.” (Id.) Porch contends that
his condition “was a direct result of the lack of
proper medical attention and the Deliberate Indifference to
my serious medical need by the defendants, Quality
Correctional Health Care and Madison County Sheriff's
seeks an order requiring Quality Correctional Health Care and
the CJC to provide proper medical care for inmates at the
CJC. (Id.) He also seeks unspecified
“[c]ompensation for pain and suffering.”
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975))).
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state law.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150
allegations that he was denied proper medical care amount to
a claim of deliberate indifference, which the Court reviews
under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). Porch refers to the Defendants only
collectively and alleges that they showed “Deliberate
Indifference to my serious medical need.” He does not
specify any Defendant's personal involvement in the
alleged denial of adequate medical treatment or allege facts
to support his conclusion that they violated his rights.
Under even a liberal construction of his complaint, Porch
fails to state a claim against any Defendant. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Marcilis v. Twp. of
Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 596-97 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008))
(affirming district court's dismissal of complaint that
“makes only categorical references to
‘Defendants'” and holding that the complaint
failed to “‘allege, with particularity, facts
that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the
asserted constitutional right'”); Frazier v.
Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx. ...