United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
THOMAS ANDERSON CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20, 2019, United States Magistrate Judge Jon A. York
submitted his Report and Recommendation on
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9). (ECF No.
14.) Plaintiffs filed untimely objections on July 29, 2019,
(ECF No. 18), to which Defendants responded (ECF No. 19).
Having reviewed the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation de novo and the entire record of the
proceedings, the Court hereby ADOPTS the
Report. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs' Motion (ECF No. 15), the Court allowed
Plaintiffs until July 26, 2019, to file any objections to
Magistrate Judge York's Report and Recommendation. (ECF
No. 17.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 provides that
“[a] paper not filed electronically is filed by
delivering it: (A) to the clerk; or (B) to a judge
who agrees to accept it for filing . . . .”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d)(2) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs waited until the filing deadline to sign and mail
their objections. (ECF No. 18 at 10.) The clerk did not
receive Plaintiffs' objections until July 29, 2019-three
days after the deadline. (ECF No. 18-1.) A filing that is
delivered to the clerk's office after the deadline is
untimely, even if the filing was mailed on or before the
deadline. Torras Herreriay Construcciones, S.A. v. M/V
Timur Star, 803 F.2d 215, 216 (6th Cir. 1986).
contend that their failure to file on time was
“excusable neglect” and that the impact caused by
their delay was insignificant and “trivial.” (ECF
No. 20-1.) Regardless of Plaintiffs' beliefs as to the
filing deadlines, Plaintiff's objections are not
well-taken. Because their objections to Magistrate Judge
York's Report and Recommendation were untimely, they fail
as a matter of law.
if the Court were to disregard the untimeliness of
Plaintiffs' filing, Plaintiffs' objections fail on
the merits. Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (ECF No. 1) and
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for Defendants' alleged violations of
Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, Fifth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege
violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986.
Magistrate Judge York is correct in that these claims should
regard to Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims, Magistrate
Judge York correctly concluded that the statute of
limitations has passed. Plaintiffs' delay in filing suit
bars them from proceeding.
refute this conclusion and assert that the continuing
violation doctrine applies, thereby allowing them to proceed
with their Section 1983 claims. Magistrate Judge York
addressed this argument in his Report and Recommendation.
(See ECF No. 14 at 4-6.)
understanding and application of the continuing violation
doctrine is contrary to the doctrine's jurisprudence.
Plaintiffs knew of the deprivation of their property in May
of 2017. The charges against Ms. Arnold were dismissed on
June 13, 2017. On June 15, 2017, Mayor Glen Spencer informed
Mr. Arnold that the van would not be released until
Plaintiffs registered the van. Plaintiffs then waited
approximately sixteen months after discovering their injury
to file suit in this Court.
erroneously contend that their delay is immaterial, as
Defendants' failure to relinquish the van amounts to a
continual violation of their rights. Plaintiffs'
assertion that the effects of Defendants'
alleged unconstitutional conduct amount to continuing
violations is without merit. See Limestone Dev. v.
Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 2008)
(citations omitted) (explaining that the continuing violation
doctrine is about a cumulative-not continuing-violation). The
Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that the continuing
violation doctrine does not apply in this case. (ECF No. 14
Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim, Magistrate
Judge York correctly concluded that Plaintiffs have not
stated a viable conspiracy claim. Consequently, Plaintiffs
also have no cause of action under Section 1986.
opposition, Plaintiffs aver that they “intend to show
that at trial there is sufficient discoverable evidence to
establish a pretext of unlawful discrimination by the
Defendants and that direct evidence of a discriminatory
policy or animus on the part of Defendants is not
required.” (ECF No. 18 at 9.) Plaintiffs' intention
to state a claim, however, is insufficient to proceed.
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs' pleadings must contain more than mere
conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
681 (2009). Because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently claimed
that an alleged conspiracy was a result of Defendants'
discrimination towards them, as members of a protected class,
neither Plaintiffs' Section 1985(3) nor their Section
1986 claims can survive.
Plaintiffs present no facts or law to show that the Report
and Recommendation should not be adopted, the Report and
Recommendation is ADOPTED in its entirety.