Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Lumpkin v. United States

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

September 3, 2019

RICHARD ALLEN LUMPKIN, Movant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          MEMORANDUM & ORDER

          ALETA A. TRAUGER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the court is Richard Lumpkin's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence in Accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 1.) Lumpkin seeks to vacate and reduce the sentence entered upon his criminal conviction in United States v. Lumpkin, No. 3:95-cr-00065 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 12, 1996) (Morton, J.), under Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), which invalidated the so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). As set forth herein, the court finds that Johnson does not apply to Lumpkin's claim and that the motion must be denied as time-barred.

         I. Procedural Background

         Lumpkin was sentenced in April 1996 to a prison term of 405 months following his guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983 (6th Cir. 1998). Lumpkin's initial motion under § 2255 was denied, Lumpkin v. United States, No. 3:00-cv-00048 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2001) (Campbell, J.), and the Sixth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability, Lumpkin v. United States, No. 01-5229 (6th Cir. Dec. 27, 2001).

         On June 20, 2016, Lumpkin filed his present Motion to Vacate, arguing that his sentencing range was calculated based on his classification as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, under a clause of the guidelines identical to the statutory provision held to be unconstitutionally vague in Johnson.[1] Consideration of the Motion was stayed pending the Sixth Circuit's review of Lumpkin's application to file a second or successive petition. (Doc. No. 6.) After the appellate court granted that application on October 4, 2016 (see Doc. No. 7), Lumpkin filed a Supplemental Brief (Doc. No. 10), asking the court to postpone ruling on his motion until the “potential rehearing process” had been completed for Raybon v. United States, 867 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2017). He expressly acknowledges therein that Raybon precludes the relief sought and that, unless the Sixth Circuit reversed course en banc, his motion must be deemed time-barred. (See Doc. No. 10, at 7.)

         In its Response, the United States argues that the movant has not asserted a right newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), and, therefore, that his motion is time-barred. (Doc. No. 12 (citing Raybon, 867 F.3d at 629-30).) Lumpkin thereafter filed a pro se Reply (Doc. No. 13).

         II. Standard of Review

          28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides a statutory mechanism for a post-conviction challenge to the imposition of a federal sentence. In order to obtain relief under § 2255, a movant “‘must demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's verdict.'” Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003)).

         A motion under § 2255 is subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The one-year period runs from “the latest of” four possible events, only two of which are relevant here:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; [or]
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review . . . .

Id. § 2255(f)(1), (3). Because his conviction became final more than twenty years ago, the current motion is clearly time-barred if subsection (1) is the latest relevant event. Lumpkin claims that he is entitled to relief under subsection (3), because Johnson articulated a newly recognized right made retroactive on collateral review.

         III. Analysis

         In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that the subsection of the ACCA that included within the scope of the definition of “violent felony” any crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, ” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)-the so-called “residual clause”-was unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, that “an increased sentence under the residual clause . . . violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process.” Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2555-56. ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.