United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Hill, a pre-trial detainee in the custody of the Davidson
County Sheriffs Office in Nashville, Tennessee, filed this
pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Doctor f/n/u Wilkins and the Davidson County Sheriffs
Office. (Doc. No. 1).
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is
frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Section 1915 A similarly requires
initial review of any "complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, "
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United
States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiffs factual allegations as
true unless they are entirely without credibility. See
Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992)). Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);
Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991),
the courts' "duty to be 'less stringent'
with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up
[unpleaded] allegations." McDonald v. Hall, 610
F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . ." To state a claim under
Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements:
(1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d
543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v.
City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533
(6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint alleges that Dr. f/n/u Wilkins examined Plaintiff
two times in August of 2019 concerning a possible eye
infection and foot fungus. According to the complaint, Dr.
Wilkins said that Plaintiffs eye "looked fine" and
he refused to give Plaintiff any medication for his eye
problem. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). The complaint further alleges
that Dr. Wilkins gave Plaintiff the wrong medication for his
foot fungus. Plaintiffs eye continues to bother him, and his
foot fungus has not gone away. (Doc. No. 1 at 8). As relief,
Plaintiff seeks an unspecified amount of compensation for his
eye and foot conditions and wants to be treated at "a
real hospital and not this jail." (Id. at 9).
complaint names two Defendants to this action: the Davidson
County Sheriffs Office in its official capacity and Dr.
Wilkins in his individual capacity. (Doc. No. 1 at 2).
a police or sheriffs department is not an entity capable of
being sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Durham
v. Estate of Gus Losleben, No. 16-1042-STA-egb, 2017 WL
1437209, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2017); McKinney v.
McNairy Cnty., Tenn., 1:12-CV-01101, 2012 WL 4863052, at
*3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2012); New by v. Sharp,
3:11-CV-534, 2012 WL 1230764, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 12,
2012); Mathes v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and
Davidson Cnty., No. 3:10-CV-0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at *2
(M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010). Thus, the complaint fails to
state claims upon which relief can be granted under Section
1983 against the Davidson County Sheriff s Office. These
claims will be dismissed.
failure to provide medical care, including care for mental
health conditions, may give rise to a violation of a
prisoner's rights under the Eighth Amendment. The United
States Supreme Court has held that deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble,429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976); Brooks v. Celeste,39 F.3d 125, 127 (6th
Cir. 1994). A claim of deliberate indifference to a
prisoner's medical needs under the Eighth Amendment has
both an objective and subjective component. Rouster v.
Cnty. of Saginaw,749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014). A
plaintiff satisfies the objective component by alleging that
the prisoner had a medical need that was "sufficiently
serious." Id. (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834). A plaintiff satisfies the subjective component
"by alleging facts which, if true, would show that the
official being sued subjectively perceived facts from ...