United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Greeneville
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
a prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2], and a motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis in this action [Doc. 1].
appears from the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial
resources to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915, this motion [Doc. 1] will be
Plaintiff is an inmate in the Hamblen County Jail, he will be
ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00.
The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account will
be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S.
District Court, 220 West Depot Street, Suite 200,
Greeneville, Tennessee, 37743, as an initial partial payment,
the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average
monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account;
or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in
his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding
the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) (A)
and (B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account shall submit twenty percent (20%) of
Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income
credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding
month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars
($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty
dollars ($350.00) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(b)(2) and 1914(a).
ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the
Clerk will be DIRECTED to mail a copy of
this memorandum and order to the custodian of inmate accounts
at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined. This
order shall be placed in Plaintiff’s prison file and
follow him if he is transferred to another correctional
institution. The Clerk also will be DIRECTED
to provide a copy to the Court’s financial deputy.
the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at
any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims that are
frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or
are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Benson v.
O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The
dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
“governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the
relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule
12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468,
470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial
review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts liberally construe
pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to
a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of a federal
right by a person acting under color of state law. Braley
v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 223 (6th Cir. 1990)
(stating that “Section 1983 . . . creates a right of
action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
complains of various criminal charges and events stemming
from 2005 forward [See Doc. 2 p. 3-20]. The Court is
not certain which charge forms the basis of Plaintiff’s
current incarceration. However, it appears that Plaintiff
alleges that he was subjected to double jeopardy in 2015 and
2016, that he has been denied the appropriate pretrial
credits for the sentence he is now serving, that
circumstances involving one of his criminal cases requires a
reopening of the case, and that officers purposefully broke
his hand while arresting him in February 2018 [Id.].
He asks the Court to “reopen [his] case, ”
reimburse him for his unlawful incarceration, and to award
him monetary damages stemming from his broken hand in
February 2018 [Id. at 4].
preliminary matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
claims seeking compensation for the use of force during his
February 2018 arrest is untimely. Federal district courts
apply the State’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions in proceedings arising under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007).
In Tennessee, that period is one year. See Tenn.
Code Ann. § 28-3-104; Foster v. State, 150
S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the one-year
statute of limitations from Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104
in a § 1983 claim). When the statute begins to run,
however, is an issue of federal law. Eidson v. State of
Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d
631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Under federal
law, a cause of action accrues, and the limitations period
begins to run, when the injury forming the basis of the claim
is discoverable. See Friedman v. Estate of Presser,
929 F.2d 1151, ...