United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga
L. COLLIER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
is a pro se prisoner who filed his complaint for violation of
his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this
action on October 18, 2017, based upon allegations that
Defendants used excessive force against him and committed
other improper acts arising out of an incident on October 29,
2015, in which various officers attempted to force Plaintiff
to vacate certain property pursuant to an eviction notice and
carried out what Plaintiff alleges was an unconstitutional
search and seizure of his property [Doc. 2 at 9-25]. Based on
this incident, Plaintiff relies on Uniform Commercial Code
3-401 to assert that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1982, 1983, 1986, and 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242,
and his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments by falsely arresting and imprisoning him and
illegally searching him and seizing his property without a
warrant [Doc. 2 at 19-23]. While Plaintiff was charged with a
number of crimes arising out of this incident, all such
charges were dismissed on August 23, 2016 [Doc. 2 at 31]. For
the reasons set forth below, however, the complaint is
untimely and therefore fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted under § 1983. As such, this action
will be DISMISSED.
the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and
shall, at any time, sua sponte dismiss any claims
that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for
relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A);
Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir.
1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme
Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim
under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A]
because the relevant statutory language tracks the language
in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial
review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings
filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of a federal
right by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,
courts apply state statutes of limitations to § 1983
claims. Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322, 331
(6th Cir. 2005). Tennessee applies a one-year statute of
limitations to § 1983 actions. Zundel v.
Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1). Federal law, however, determines
“[t]he date on which the statute of limitations begins
to run in a § 1983 action.” Eidson v. State of
Tenn. Dept. of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631,
634-35 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cty.
of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997)).
statute of limitations for many of Plaintiff's civil
rights claims began to run on October 29, 2015, the date of
Plaintiff's arrest and the alleged illegal search and
seizure of Plaintiff's property without a warrant.
Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir 2007)
(holding that a claim for excessive force under § 1983
arising out of the effectuation of an arrest accrues at the
time of arrest); Michel v. City of Akron, 278
Fed.Appx. 477, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Fourth
Amendment claim under § 1983 begins to run at the time
of the search and seizure); Otworth v. Vanderploeg,
61 Fed. App'x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that the
statute of limitations for a due process claim began to run
when the plaintiff had reason to know that he was subject to
certain restrictions on a property he inherited).
latest date on which the statute of limitations for
Plaintiff's other civil rights claims began to run would
be August 23, 2016, however, as that is the date on which the
criminal charges against Plaintiff based on the incident in
the complaint were dismissed [Doc. 2 at 31]. See
Tenn. Code. Ann. § 28-3-104(a); see also King v.
Harwood, 852 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that the
statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution claim
under § 1983 did not begin to run until the date on
which a charge is dismissed); Collyer v. Darling, 98
F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that the statute of
limitations for false imprisonment claim under § 1983
begins to run when plaintiff is released from false
such, all of Plaintiff's claims, which he filed on
October 18, 2017 [Doc. 2 at 26], are clearly time-barred.
reasons set forth above, even liberally construing the
complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.
Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A)
and Plaintiff's pending motions [Docs. 24, 2, 29, 30, and
31] will be DENIED as moot.
Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this
action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally
frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24.