United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING
THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON DEFENDANT MILAN
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
April 5, 2018, Plaintiff Bobby Lee Marable, who is
incarcerated at the Gibson County Correctional Complex (GCCX)
in Trenton, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint and
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1
& 2.) The Court issued an order on April 6, 2018,
granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Court also granted
Marable's motion to supplement his complaint to add the
names of the Defendants he sues and to request a jury trial.
(ECF Nos. 5 & 6.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants
as the GCCX, Lieutenant Nick Milan, Lieutenant First Name
Unknown (FNU) Kelly, Lieutenant Christine Combs, Twila
Claybon, Dakota Hicks, and Officer FNU Jordan.
alleges that on August 10, 2017, Lieutenant Milan and Officer
Miller (who Marable does not name as a Defendant) used
excessive force while arresting Marable. (ECF No. 1 at PageID
1.) Marable claims that, while he was handcuffed and laying
on his stomach, Milan punched him “in the right side of
my face and head at least 10 times, ” while Miller
twisted Marable's handcuffs causing his wrists to bleed
and hands to turn numb. (Id.) The officers then
allegedly dragged Marable by his feet despite his protests
that an object protruding from the ground was jabbing and
cutting him. (Id.) The officers allegedly responded
that they did not care about his discomfort and refused to
allow Marable to stand, saying “that's what [you]
officers took Marable to the GCCX, where Officer Jordan
allegedly refused him medical attention. (Id. at
PageID 2.) Officers Jordan, Milan, and Miller reiterated,
“that's what [you] get for running from the
Officers.” (Id.) Medical personnel eventually
arrived but told Marable nothing was wrong with him.
(Id.) A transporting officer informed the medical
staff that Marable likely was dehydrated, causing him to
vomit out the patrol car window en route to GCCX.
(Id.) Marable was processed the next morning and
released on bond. (Id.) He alleges that a pocket
knife and money from his wallet were missing from the
personal items returned to him. (Id.)
alleges that months later, on February 27, 2018, when he was
in custody at the GCCX, Officers Claybon, Hicks, and Combs
took his mattress that he had exchanged with an inmate who
was being released. (Id.) Marable was forced to
sleep on the concrete floor for several days, which
“was very uncomfortable sleeping.” (Id.
at PageID 2-3.) On March 7, 2018, Lieutenant Kelly came to
Marable's cell to deny him a cell transfer. (Id.
at PageID 3.) Marable alleges that Kelly knew Marable had no
mattress but said nothing about it. (Id.) Officers
Jordan and Paige (who Marable does not name as a Defendant)
brought Marable a mattress the next day. (Id.)
in passing also alleges that his diet “needs to be
fixed because I have acid reflux.” (Id.) He
claims he has filled out several medical requests for medical
attention but still has not received a different diet.
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975))).
does not specify the jurisdictional basis for his complaint
or the relief he seeks. Based on the allegations in the
complaint, the Court presumes Marable intends to proceed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party ...