United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
L. PARKER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Ruvye Cowley moves to dismiss Defendant United Consumer
Financial Services Company's (“UCFSC”)
Counterclaim for breach of contract. (ECF No. 59.) For the
reasons below, this Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to
Dismiss UCFSC's Counterclaim for breach of contract.
received an Equifax and Trans Union credit disclosure that
reported a UCFSC trade line with a scheduled monthly payment
of $72.00. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) She then sent Equifax a
dispute letter claiming that the trade line was charged off
and closed, meaning she did not have an obligation to make
monthly payments. (Id. at 5.) Equifax and Trans
Union forwarded Plaintiff's dispute to UCFSC, who did not
make any changes to its reporting. (Id.) Plaintiff
then filed this lawsuit claiming the report was misleading
and inaccurate. (Id. at 9.)
alleged that UCFSC violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”) by reporting a scheduled monthly payment
when the account was, in fact, charged off and closed.
(Id. at 5.) Plaintiff also alleged that UCFSC did
not adequately investigate her dispute notice. (Id.
at 8-9.) And Plaintiff claimed these violations caused her
credit and emotional damages, undue stress, anxiety, mental
anguish, suffering, and embarrassment. (Id. at
then filed a Counterclaim against Plaintiff for breach of
contract. (See ECF No. 55 at PageID 286-87.) UCFSC
claims that it entered into a “Retail Installment
Contract / Security Agreement”
(“Agreement”) with Plaintiff. (Id. at
PageID 286.) Plaintiff signed the Agreement jointly with
another borrower. (Id. at PageID 287.)
the Agreement, UCFSC provided Plaintiff with $1, 400.00 in
consumer financing. (Id.) In return, Plaintiff
agreed to make 24 monthly payments of $72.04 to UCFSC to
repay the principal plus interest. (Id.) Yet UCFSC
alleges that Plaintiff failed to timely pay the amounts owed,
and it accelerated the debt under the Agreement.
(Id.) As a result, UCFSC argues that Plaintiff owes
$867.00, plus late fees and interest. (Id.)
now asks this Court to dismiss UCFSC's Counterclaim by
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to
dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and
the law presumes that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction.” Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc.,
772 F.3d 1056, 1064 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted). So the plaintiff or
counter-claimant “has the burden of proving
jurisdiction” to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1). Moir v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit
Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990).
however, does not challenge the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction here. Instead, Plaintiff contends that the Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Defendant's Counterclaim. (ECF No. 59 at PageID 365.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, when a court properly retains
original jurisdiction over a civil action, it “shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims . . . so
related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form a part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The Sixth
Circuit has held that claims form part of the same case or
controversy when they derive from a common nucleus of
operative facts. Blakely v. United States, 3276 F.3d
853, 861 (6th Cir. 2002).
Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
a claim if: (1) it “raises a novel or complex issue of
State law”; (2) it “substantially predominates
over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction”; (3) the court “has
dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction”; or (4) in exceptional circumstances,
“there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.” Id. § 1367(c)(1)-(4).
District courts enjoy “broad discretion in deciding