United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
BENJAMIN F. MILES, IV, Plaintiff,
SHELBY COUNTY CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, ET AL., Defendants.
ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING
THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON DEFENDANTS CONNOLLY,
BARKER AND WHITE
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
April 17, 2019, Plaintiff Benjamin F. Miles, IV, a pretrial
detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center in
Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court
issued an order on April 22, 2019, granting leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall
record the Defendants as the Shelby County Criminal Justice
Center (Jail), Lieutenant A. Connolly, and Corrections
Officers (C/O) Taliha Barker and Kimberly White.
asserts that he has been subjected to punishment, physical
and sexual abuse, and harassment at the Jail on various dates
since February 2019. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He alleges that
Lieutenant Connolly failed to supervise and instruct his
officers to follow proper protocol and instead advised them
to “perform the actions of cruel & unusual
punishment, ” including not giving soap to inmates on
lockdown after they have used the restroom. (Id.)
Connolly also allegedly placed Miles in
“predetention” for thirty days, where he was not
able to shower, change clothes, or clean. (Id.)
alleges that C/O Barker failed to give him a meal on one
occasion and had him sent to administrative segregation for
thirty days “because of personal feelings” and
based on false allegations (Id.) Miles alleges that
Barker verbally abused him and “defimated [sic] my
character and caused problems for my upcoming trial.”
(Id.) Barker also allegedly had Miles sent to
“deadlock & detention” because he filed
alleges that C/O White choked him and pushed his head into a
wall on one occasion. (Id.) He alleges she harasses
him and has sexually abused him by grabbing his penis,
pulling his pants up into his buttocks, and telling him that
he is “going to get fucked in prison.”
seeks monetary damages against all defendants. (Id.
at PageID 5.)
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d
1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party ...