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Manley v. Fayette County Justice Center

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

October 28, 2019

JOE GLENN MANLEY, Plaintiff,
v.
FAYETTE COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER, ET AL., Defendants.

          ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

          JAMES D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         On May 29, 2019, Plaintiff Joe Glenn Manley, who at the time was an inmate at the Fayette County Justice Complex (FCJC) in Somerville, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) The Court issued an order on May 30, 2019, directing Manley to either pay the entire civil filing fee or submit an in forma pauperis affidavit and a copy of his inmate trust account statement in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 3.) However, before complying with that order, Manley notified the Court he was being released from the FCJC. (ECF Nos. 4 & 5.) The Court therefore directed Manley to submit either the filing fee or a non-prisoner in forma pauperis affidavit. (ECF No. 6.) Manley filed the appropriate affidavit on July 1, 2019, (ECF No. 9), and the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (ECF No. 10).[1] The Clerk shall record the Defendants as Fayette County[2] and Quality Correctional Health Care (QCHC).

         Manley alleges that he was incarcerated at the FCJC beginning in December 2018 after being discharged from a hospital against a doctor's advice. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He alleges that he has “severe medical issues and now mental issues also.” (Id.) He alleges that an unnamed nurse or doctor at the FCJC misdiagnosed him after receiving documents from the hospital. (Id.) As a result, he allegedly was “mistreated and abused [and] left with some crippling pains due to negligence of proper medical treatment.” (Id.) He asserts that unnamed medical staff refused to provide him with “the proper treatment at a hospital.” (Id.)

         Manley attached to his complaint a letter with additional detail about his confinement at the FCJC. (ECF No. 1-1.) He alleges that he “was constantly begging for medical assistance” while at the FCJC. (Id. at PageID 5.) He alleges that Nurse Amy Franks, who is not listed as a Defendant, diagnosed him with osteoarthritis without touching Manley or checking his vitals. (Id.) She prescribed Manley Mobic (generic Meloxicam)[3] for pain, but Manley alleges he remained in “severe pain.” (Id.)

         Manley alleges that his fiancée called Fayette County Sheriff Bobby Riles, who is not listed as a defendant, but “[t]he call did not go well.” (Id.) Manley was then sent to segregation for “medical observation” by FCJC Chief Deputy Dollahite, Chief Jail Administrator Francis Turner, Lieutenant Bailey, or Lieutenant White, none of whom are listed as defendants in the complaint. (Id.)

         Manley later saw Nurse Franks for additional treatment, who allegedly told him that he needed surgery but that she could not refer him to a hospital. (Id.) Instead, Franks prescribed a high dosage of Meloxicam and a steroid pack and told Manley to apply heat to his sore areas and to ambulate. (Id. at PageID 6.) Manley says that, despite the high dose of medication, he remains in severe pain “almost to the point of mental anguish.” (Id.)

         Manley asserts that Sheriff Riles placed him in segregation as retaliation.[4] (Id. at PageID 6-7.) He alleges that his phone use, church services, access to the kiosk machine, bunk, and privacy have been limited or taken from him in segregation. (Id. at PageID 7.) He alleges in passing that unnamed correctional officers have opened his legal mail. (Id.) He also alleges that he remained in segregation despite committing no disciplinary infractions. (Id. at PageID 8.)

         Manley seeks “proper medical treatment from proffesional [sic] Hospitals and doctors for physical and mental issues” and wants FCJC or QCHC to pay for the treatment. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.) He also seeks damages. (Id.)

         The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint-

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

         In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ” and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

         “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ...


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