United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division
ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING
THAT PROCESS BE ISSUED AND SERVED ON THE REMAINING
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
17, 2019, Plaintiff Adrian Dontrell Young, who is a pretrial
detainee at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center (Jail)
in Memphis, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed
in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court
issued an order on June 20, 2019, granting leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 5.) The Clerk shall
record the Defendants as Officers Cedric Scott, L. Elliot, D.
Rodgers, First Name Unknown (FNU) Pree, and T. Halliburton;
and Sergeant FNU Cleaves.
alleges that on March 21, 2019, he was sent to “the
whole [sic]” for threatening staff. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID 2.) One week later, on March 28, 2019, Sergeant
Cleaves and Officers Elliot and Pree came to Young's cell
and told him to change into a jumpsuit. (Id.)
Young protested being told to wear the jumpsuit.
(Id.) Officer Scott allegedly entered the floor
where Young was housed and stated, “Fuck that Bitch
spr[a]y his ass.” (Id.) Young alleges that he
was handcuffed, and Elliot pulled back on his arms and pulled
him into a closet, causing his wrists to bleed.
(Id.) Pree also allegedly grabbed one of Young's
arms, and Cleaves grabbed Young by the neck. (Id.)
Officer Rodgers cuffed Young's legs together and pulled
him to the ground. (Id.) Scott then sprayed Young
with an unidentified substance while he was on the ground,
and all the officers kicked him. (Id.)
attachment Young filed with the Court, he alleges that
“some of the officer's [sic]” are still
bullying him. (ECF No. 4 at PageID 17.) He has requested to
be moved to a different cell away from the control booth, but
the Jail refused his request. (Id.) He alleges that
Officer Pree has continued to abuse him, denied him
recreation, “play[ed] with [his] food, ” and
threatened him. (Id.) Pree on one occasion allegedly
smashed a food tray containing foods to which Young is
allergic in the security flap of Young's cell, causing
food to fly around the cell. (Id.)
seeks an investigation “to get to the bottom of
this” and compensatory damages. (ECF No. 1 at PageID
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d
1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state ...