United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
MEMORANDUM
Aleta
A. Trauger United States District Judge.
Plaintiff
Astin Hill, [1] an inmate of the Davidson County
Sheriff's Office in Nashville, Tennessee, filed this pro
se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Beth Gentry and Chief Brown.[2] (Doc. No. 1).
Subsequent
to filing the complaint, Plaintiff Hill submitted a
supplemental pleading (Doc. No. 5) and a document entitled
“Additional Constitutional Rights.” (Doc. No. 7).
The court will screen the original complaint, as informed by
these supplemental pleadings, pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
I.
PLRA Screening Standard
Under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is
frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The
court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United
States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th
Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiff's factual
allegations as true unless they are entirely without
credibility. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437
(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Although pro se
pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se
complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded]
allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
III.
Section 1983 Standard
Title
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges
“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under
Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements:
(1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d
543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v.
City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533
(6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV.
Alleged Facts
The
complaint alleges that the defendants have
“discriminated and retaliated against” the
plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Specifically, the complaint
alleges that “the people who do the disciplinary
hearing disposition messed up our lock down time and Mrs.
Beth Gentry is refusing [sic] to let out of seg after we
serve our lock down time.” (Id.) According to
the complaint, the plaintiff has “seen the review broad
[sic] twice”, and the defendants “still won't
let us go back to population.” (Id.) The
plaintiff believes that the defendants' conduct violates
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
the double jeopardy clause. (Id.)
V.
Analysis
A.
Retaliation
A
prisoner's claim that prison officials have retaliated
against him for engaging in protected conduct is grounded in
the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d
378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation within the context of Section 1983, a plaintiff
must prove that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an
adverse action was taken against him that would deter a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that
conduct; and (3) the defendant's conduct was
substantially motivated at least in part by retaliation for
the plaintiff's protected speech and conduct.
Id. at 394-99. In addition to proving a retaliatory
motive, the plaintiff must establish that the alleged
discriminatory action was punitive in nature by showing other
than de minimis harm resulting from it. See
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977);
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. The plaintiff has the
burden of proof on all three elements. Murray v. Unknown
Evert, 84 Fed.Appx. 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003).
While
the plaintiff contends that he was subjected to acts of
retaliation-that the defendants “messed up [his] lock
down time” and refused to let him out of segregation
the plaintiff does not provide any further information
pertaining to the alleged acts of retaliation. For example,
the complaint fails to allege that the defendants'
conduct was substantially motivated, at least in part, by
retaliation for the plaintiff's protected speech and
content. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d 378, 394-99. Although
pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), a court's
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se
complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded]
allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted); see also Johnson
v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th
Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint
for failure to comply with “unique pleading
requirements” and stating “a court cannot
'create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out
in his pleading”') (quoting Clark v. Nat'l
Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.
1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec'y of
Treas., 73 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming
sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either ...