Hill v. Gentry

          MEMORANDUM

          Aleta A. Trauger United States District Judge.

         Plaintiff Astin Hill, ^[1] an inmate of the Davidson County Sheriff's Office in Nashville, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Beth Gentry and Chief Brown.^[2] (Doc. No. 1).

         Subsequent to filing the complaint, Plaintiff Hill submitted a supplemental pleading (Doc. No. 5) and a document entitled “Additional Constitutional Rights.” (Doc. No. 7). The court will screen the original complaint, as informed by these supplemental pleadings, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

         I. PLRA Screening Standard

         Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, ” id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).

         The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6^th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6^th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts' “duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).

         III. Section 1983 Standard

         Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6^th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6^th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

         IV. Alleged Facts

         The complaint alleges that the defendants have “discriminated and retaliated against” the plaintiff. (Doc. No. 1 at 5). Specifically, the complaint alleges that “the people who do the disciplinary hearing disposition messed up our lock down time and Mrs. Beth Gentry is refusing [sic] to let out of seg after we serve our lock down time.” (Id.) According to the complaint, the plaintiff has “seen the review broad [sic] twice”, and the defendants “still won't let us go back to population.” (Id.) The plaintiff believes that the defendants' conduct violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the double jeopardy clause. (Id.)

         V. Analysis

         A. Retaliation

         A prisoner's claim that prison officials have retaliated against him for engaging in protected conduct is grounded in the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation within the context of Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the defendant's conduct was substantially motivated at least in part by retaliation for the plaintiff's protected speech and conduct. Id. at 394-99. In addition to proving a retaliatory motive, the plaintiff must establish that the alleged discriminatory action was punitive in nature by showing other than de minimis harm resulting from it. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977); Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. The plaintiff has the burden of proof on all three elements. Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 Fed.Appx. 553, 556 (6^th Cir. 2003).

         While the plaintiff contends that he was subjected to acts of retaliation-that the defendants “messed up [his] lock down time” and refused to let him out of segregation the plaintiff does not provide any further information pertaining to the alleged acts of retaliation. For example, the complaint fails to allege that the defendants' conduct was substantially motivated, at least in part, by retaliation for the plaintiff's protected speech and content. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d 378, 394-99. Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), a court's “duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted); see also Johnson v. Matauszak, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot 'create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading”') (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); Payne v. Sec'y of Treas., 73 Fed.Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either ...