United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
MALIK M. MOORE, Plaintiff,
PRISONER TRANSPORT SERVICES, Defendant.
RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
the Court is a pro se complaint for alleged
violation of civil rights (Doc. No. 1), filed by Malik M.
Moore, a former inmate of the Portage County Jail in Stevens
Point, Wisconsin. The complaint was originally filed in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri, which provisionally granted pauper status based on
Plaintiff's application and transferred the matter to
this Court. (Doc. Nos. 2, 4.)
matter is now before the Court for a determination of
Plaintiff's pauper status and an initial review of the
complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42
U.S.C. § 1997e.
TO PROCEED AS A PAUPER
the Western District of Missouri's transfer of this
action and provisional grant of pauper status, this Court
found Plaintiff's application for pauper status deficient
due to the lack of a certified copy of his inmate trust fund
account statement and ordered him to cure the deficiency
within 28 days. (Doc. No. 8.) However, Plaintiff appears to
have been released from jail prior to this deadline, and now
seeks an extension of time in which to complete his
application for pauper status. (Doc. No. 9.)
light of Plaintiff's release from confinement, and given
that his original application was not a short-form
application for prisoners but a long-form declaration of his
income, assets, and obligations that demonstrates his poverty
(Doc. No. 2), Plaintiff will be allowed to proceed in this
Court without payment of the filing fee. By separate Order,
the Court will grant Plaintiff pauper status and deny as moot
his motion for an extension of time to complete his
application therefor. (Doc. No. 9.)
REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss any
IFP complaint that is facially frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Similarly, Section 1915A provides that the Court
shall conduct an initial review of any prisoner complaint
against a governmental entity, officer, or employee, and
shall dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof if the
defects listed in Section 1915(e)(2)(B) are identified. Under
both statutes, this initial review of whether the complaint
states a claim upon which relief may be granted asks whether
it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face, ” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Applying
this standard, the Court must view the complaint in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff and, again, must take all
well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M
& G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir.
2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466
(6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)). Furthermore, pro
se pleadings must be liberally construed and “held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1976)). However, pro se litigants are not exempt
from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th
Cir. 1989), nor can the Court “create a claim which [a
plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading.”
Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 613 (6th Cir.
2011) (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins.
Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)).
SECTION 1983 STANDARD
no basis for this Court's jurisdiction is provided in the
complaint (see Doc. No. 1 at 3), the complaint is
liberally construed as seeking to vindicate alleged
violations of Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of
action against any person who, acting under color of state
law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws.
Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th
Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff
must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2)
that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under
color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d
592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
ALLEGATIONS AND CLAIMS