United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Anthony Lee Fisher, an inmate of the Dickson County jail in
Charlotte, Tennessee, filed this pro se, in forma pauperis
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Captain Amy
Longtin, Chief Jerome Holt, Lieutenant f/n/u Quigley, Sheriff
Jeff Bledsoe, the Dickson County Sheriff's Office, and
Southern Health Partners. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff also filed
a motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. No. 3).
complaint is before the Court for an initial review pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
PLRA Screening Standard
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any
portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is
frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires
initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in
which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity, ”
id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the
complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in §
1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United
States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016)
(citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)),
and accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true
unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas
v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).
Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v.
Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts'
“duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se
complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded]
allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Section 1983 Standard
U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any
person who, acting under color of state law, abridges
“rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under
Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements:
(1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of
state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d
543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of
Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
complaint alleges that while Plaintiff has been incarcerated
at the Dickson County jail since June 30, 2019, he repeatedly
has asked for treatment of his Hepatitis C. According to the
complaint, certain Defendants told Plaintiff that inmates at
this facility will not be provided treatment for Hepatitis C.
Plaintiff has received no treatment for Hepatitis C while
incarcerated at the Dickson County jail. In particular, he
has not received any blood work or monitoring “to see
the progression of the disease or the damage progression of
[his] liver.” (Doc. No. 1 at 6).
complaint further alleges that Defendants also refused to
provide Plaintiff with dentures and instead offered to
extract the teeth that were causing Plaintiff
crux of the complaint is that Defendants have failed to
provide Plaintiff with appropriate treatment and medication
for his known Hepatitis C diagnosis and have refused to
provide him with dentures while he has been an inmate at the
Dickson County jail.
to provide medical care, including dental care, may give rise
to a violation of a prisoner's rights under the Eighth
Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has held that
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Brooks v.
Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1994). A claim of
deliberate indifference to a prisoner's medical needs
under the Eighth Amendment has both an objective and
subjective component. Rouster v. Cnty. of Saginaw,
749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff satisfies the
objective component by alleging that the prisoner had a
medical need that was “sufficiently serious.”
Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A
plaintiff satisfies the subjective component “by
alleging facts which, if true, would show that the official
being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer
substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw
the inference, and that he then ...