Session August 22, 2019
Appeal
from the General Sessions Court for Campbell County No.
2014-DR-102 Amanda Sammons, Judge
In this
post-divorce action, the husband sought to modify his alimony
obligation to the wife. The trial court denied the
husband's petition to modify, determining that the
husband had failed to prove that a substantial and material
change in circumstance had occurred since entry of the
divorce decree. The husband has appealed. Discerning no
reversible error, we affirm.
Tenn.
R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the General
Sessions Court Affirmed; Case Remanded
Robert
R. Asbury, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joseph R.
Jones.
Terry
M. Basista, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Carla Jo
Capps Jones.
Thomas
R. Frierson, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in
which Charles D. Susano, Jr., and John W. McClarty, JJ.,
joined.
OPINION
THOMAS
R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
On
August 1, 2014, the plaintiff, Carla Capps Jones
("Wife"), filed a complaint seeking a divorce from
the defendant, Joseph R. Jones ("Husband"), in the
Campbell County General Sessions Court ("trial
court"). According to Wife, the parties had been married
since March 1989 and had one minor child.[1] Wife
concomitantly filed the parties' signed and notarized
marital dissolution agreement ("MDA"), wherein the
parties agreed that Husband would pay to Wife $3, 577
monthly, representing both his alimony and child support
obligations. The MDA specifically stated that "after
determination of child support[, ] remaining balance shall be
alimony." The MDA provided that Wife would retain the
marital residence and two additional lots of real property
and would also be responsible for the attendant debt related
thereto. It further provided that Husband would retain his
retirement account and that each party would keep the
personalty in his or her possession.
On
August 12, 2014, Wife filed an agreed permanent parenting
plan ("PPP"), which provided that Wife would be the
primary residential parent of the minor child and would
exercise 280 days per year of co-parenting time, with Husband
enjoying 85 days of co-parenting time annually. The PPP
failed to set forth a specific schedule for Husband's
co-parenting time; rather, it simply stated that Husband
"shall exercise parenting time by agreement." The
PPP specified that Husband would pay child support to Wife in
the amount of $765 per month based upon the parties'
respective incomes and the calculation contained in the
attached child support worksheet.
Thereafter,
the parties filed an amended MDA, which additionally provided
that Husband had quitclaimed his interest in the marital home
to Wife. The trial court entered a final decree of divorce on
November 5, 2014, referencing and approving the parties'
amended MDA.
Three
years later, on November 1, 2017, Husband filed a petition in
the trial court seeking to modify his alimony obligation.
Husband averred that he had not been represented by counsel
during the divorce proceedings. He argued that the alimony
provision in the parties' amended MDA was deficient
because it did not state whether the alimony award was in the
nature of in futuro, rehabilitative, or transitional
alimony. Husband also contended that the alimony award should
be modified because Wife was awarded a greater share of the
marital property and Husband was paying over one-half of his
monthly income to Wife. Wife filed an answer, wherein she
pointed out that Husband had appeared in court and agreed to
the MDA's provisions at the time of the divorce.
The
trial court conducted a hearing concerning Husband's
petition on June 29, 2018, and October 22, 2018. The court
subsequently entered an order on December 7, 2018,
determining that the petition for modification should be
denied. The court noted that Husband's monthly child
support obligation had been set at $765 per month pursuant to
the agreed PPP and that neither party had disputed this
obligation. Furthermore, the court found that because the
alimony award was for an indefinite time period, it was
properly characterized as alimony in futuro.
Although acknowledging that an award of alimony in
futuro was modifiable upon a proper showing of a
substantial and material change in circumstance, the court
determined that Husband had failed to prove such a change in
this case. The court specifically found in pertinent part:
Although Husband testified under oath that he is no longer
able to pay the alimony that he obligated himself to pay back
in 2014, the Court finds that Husband has failed to meet his
burden of proving that a substantial and material change in
circumstances has occurred such as would allow a modification
of alimony at this time. To the contrary, Husband's
finances have improved since the parties divorced. His income
has risen, though slightly. He is now remarried, although he
declines to testify about or even acknowledge his current
household income. Husband's main assertion is that his
debt-to-income ratio has been detrimentally affected by
several factors, including his name remaining on the deed to
the former marital residence, his current credit card and
personal debt, and his requirement to continue paying alimony
and the fee for Wife's car tags. Yet none of these rises
to the level of constituting a substantial and material
change of circumstances.
Thus, based on the testimony of the parties, the evidence
presented, the argument of counsel and the applicable law,
the Court does not find that any substantial or material
change in circumstances has arisen such as would allow the
court to amend the prior agreement of these parties. Husband
agreed to pay alimony to the Wife in the amount specified in
the Amended Marital Dissolution Agreement for an indefinite
period of time. Wife was married to Husband for twenty-five
(25) years, relinquishing income-earning potential in
exchange for operating a home and rearing the ...