United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Columbia Division
Honorable William L, Campbell, Jr., District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Barbara D. Holmes United States Magistrate Judge
By
Order entered August 26, 2019 (Docket Entry No. 12), the
Court referred this pro se civil action to the
Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 636(b)(1) and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Presently
pending before the Court is a show cause order (Docket Entry
No. 14), to which Plaintiff has not responded, and a motion
to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 20), to which Plaintiff has also
not responded. For the reasons set out below, the undersigned
Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends that this action be
dismissed.
I.
BACKGROUND
Ronald
Paul Knowles (“Plaintiff”) is a resident of
Waynesboro, Tennessee. On August 23, 2019, he filed this
pro se lawsuit. See Complaint (Docket Entry
No. 1). Since sometime in 2018, Plaintiff has been involved
in a divorce proceeding with Robyn Dell (Finley) Knowles
(“Finley”) in the Chancery Court for Maury
County, Tennessee (“Chancery Court”), and this
lawsuit arises out of his displeasure with the outcome of the
divorce proceeding. Plaintiff alleges that he was not married
to Finley and that he testified as such in the Chancery Court
but that Finley, in conjunction with her divorce attorney,
Michael D. Cox (“Cox”), presented the state judge
with a forged or fraudulent marriage
certificate.[1] Plaintiff's theory of not being
married to Finley was apparently rejected by the Chancery
Court because a Final Decree of Divorce, which is not a part
of the record, was entered at some point by Judge Stella L.
Hargrove (“Judge Hargrove”), and on August 16,
2019, Judge Hargrove issued an order (“the August 16,
2019 Order”) that amended the divorce decree by: (1)
finding that Plaintiff and Finley owned real property located
at 665 Deer Ridge Road, Waynesboro, Tennessee (“the
Property”); (2) appointing a special master to conduct
a sale of the Property within thirty days of entry of the
order; and, (3) directing that proceeds of the sale should be
split equally between Plaintiff and Finley.[2]
It is
unclear from the record whether Plaintiff sought an appeal or
other remedy in the state courts from either the final
divorce decree or the August 16, 2019 Order. However,
Plaintiff initiated the instant federal lawsuit in an effort
to reverse the course of the divorce proceeding and the
implementation of the August 16, 2019 Order. His original,
handwritten complaint names Finley, Cox, and Judge Hargrove
as defendants. See Complaint at 2-3. The entirety of
the factual allegations set out in the original complaint is
minimal and states:
I Ronald P Knowles made statement on August 16, 2019, on who
owns real property at 665 Deer Ridge Road, Waynesboro, TN in
Maury Co Court. Judge denied my case. House up for sale that
day in Wayne Co. Clerk's Office. There not giving me 30
days the real property is to be sold Saturday 24 of Aug.
2019.
Id. at 4. Accompanying the original complaint was an
emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, in which Plaintiff sought to enjoin
Defendants from “engaging in, and or, perpetuating
further ‘Corrupt Racketeering Activities.'”
See Docket Entry No. 2 at 1.[3] The Court denied this
motion, finding that “Plaintiff has not demonstrated a
strong or substantial likelihood of success at this stage of
the proceedings because the material facts relating to
Plaintiff's claims have not been established.”
See Order entered August 23, 2019 (Docket Entry No.
7) at 2.
Plaintiff
subsequently filed an Amended Verified Complaint, removing
Judge Hargrove as a defendant but reiterating his allegations
that (1) he was never married to Finley and that she and Cox
falsified a marriage certificate and (2) he has been
wrongfully deprived of his property by virtue of the August
16, 2019 Order. Plaintiff sets forth claims against Finley
and Cox (referred to hereinafter as “Defendants”)
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), alleging that
“through fraud upon the court of falsified evidence,
[Defendants] have deprived Plaintiff of his right to due
process and equal protection of the laws. Through fraud upon
the court, [ Defendants] are in de facto conspiracy with the
court and are acting as “state actors.”
See Amended Verified Complaint at 5.[4]He seeks
unspecific equitable relief, as well as “his costs of
relocating and or replacing his property.” Id.
at 5-6. In conjunction with his amended complaint, Plaintiff
filed a second motion for a temporary restraining order,
seeking to prohibit Finley, Cox, and the appointed special
master from “the continued auction and sale of his home
and property.” By Order entered September 17, 2019
(Docket Entry No. 17), the Court denied this motion.
II.
SHOW CAUSE ORDER AND MOTION TO DISMISS
Because
the Court's initial review of Plaintiff's filings
revealed substantial questions about whether subject matter
jurisdiction over the lawsuit exists, the Court issued an
order on August 29, 2019 (Docket Entry No. 14) (“Show
Cause Order”), directing Plaintiff to show cause why
his lawsuit should not be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff was specifically alerted in
the Show Cause Order that: (1) the Rooker/Feldman
abstention doctrine set out in District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923),
appears to apply to this case and would preclude the Court
from hearing Plaintiff's claims; (2) the “domestic
relations exception” appears to preclude this Court
from becoming involved in what is essentially a state law
divorce matter; and, (3) this Court appears to have no
subject matter jurisdiction to hear what is essentially a
challenge that seeks to reverse the Chancery Court decisions.
Although Plaintiff was given a deadline of September 13,
2019, to respond to the Show Cause Order, he has not
responded in any manner.
Defendants
then filed the pending motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No.
20) in lieu of an answer. Defendants argue that both the
Rooker/Feldman abstention doctrine and the domestic
relations exception apply and preclude the Court from
adjudicating the case. They further argue that they are not
state actors for the purposes of Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim and that Plaintiff is not a member of a
discrete and insular minority for the purposes of his 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) claim, two shortcomings which they
assert require dismissal of the claims. Although Plaintiff
was notified of the motion and given a deadline of October 9,
2019, to file a response, see Order entered
September 24, 2019 (Docket Entry No. 22), he has not
responded in any manner to the motion.
Although
Defendants do not bring their motion under Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they seek dismissal, in
part, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on the
allegations set out in Plaintiff's pleadings. Such a
facial attack “questions merely the sufficiency of the
pleadings.” Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v.
Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007).
In reviewing such a challenge, the Court will accept the
factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.
With respect to Defendants' request for dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(6), the Court likewise accepts as true all of the
well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, resolves all
doubts in Plaintiff's favor, and construes the complaint
liberally in favor of the pro se Plaintiff. See
Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006);
Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999);
Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10,
11-12 (6th Cir. 1987). ...