United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division
RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
moves to dismiss this habeas corpus action as untimely. (Doc.
No. 11.) Petitioner has responded in opposition to the motion
(Doc. No. 13), and Respondent has replied. (Doc. No. 15.) The
Court has reviewed the parties' filings and agrees with
Respondent that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable
tolling of the statute of limitations and that his petition
is therefore untimely.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony murder and
aggravated child abuse on April 12, 2007. (Doc. No. 10-1 at
131, 136.) The trial court sentenced him to life and 22 years
in prison, respectively, and ordered the sentences to run
consecutively. (Id.) The trial court denied
Petitioner's motion for new trial on July 20, 2007.
November 30, 2009, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
vacated Petitioner's conviction for aggravated child
abuse but affirmed the felony murder conviction and modified
his sentence to life in prison. (Doc. No. 10-10.) In an
opinion entered January 25, 2011, the Tennessee Supreme Court
reversed that judgment in part, affirmed the conviction and
life sentence for felony murder, and reinstated the
conviction and sentence for aggravated child abuse. (Doc. No.
did not file any further challenges to his convictions or
sentences until he placed the pending habeas petition in the
prison mail system on June 17, 2019. (Doc. No. 1 at 20.) On July
9, 2019, the Court ordered Respondent to file an answer or
motion in response to the petition (Doc. No. 4), and on
August 30, 2019, Respondent filed the pending motion to
dismiss along with a memorandum in support and the relevant
portions of the state-court record. (Doc. No. 10-12.)
Petitioner responded to the motion to dismiss on September
17, 2019, (Doc. No. 13), and Respondent filed a reply on
October 3, 2019, at the Court's direction. (Doc. Nos.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes
a one-year limitations period for habeas petitions brought by
prisoners challenging state-court convictions. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d). Under this provision, the limitations period
runs from the latest of four enumerated events:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner does not allege any
circumstances triggering subsections (B)- (D). Accordingly,
his limitations period began to run on Monday, April 25,
2011, 90 days after the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled on his
direct appeal, when the time within which he could have
sought review by the United States Supreme Court expired.
See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119-120
(2009) (holding that state convictions are final under §
2244(d)(1)(A) when Supreme Court certiorari is exhausted or
when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires);
S.Ct. R. 13.3 (providing 90 days from date of entry of the
judgment or order sought to be reviewed).
the running of the period is tolled under § 2244(d)(2)
while any “properly filed” collateral review
petition is pending in state court, Petitioner never filed
such a petition in state court. His one-year limitations
period, therefore, ran without interruption until it expired
on Wednesday, April 25, 2012. His federal habeas petition
filed on June 17, 2019, is ...