United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AS MOOT AND GRANTING LEAVE
D. TODD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
11, 2019, Plaintiff Granville Elam, who is incarcerated at
the Gibson County Correctional Complex in Trenton, Tennessee,
filed a pro se document which was opened as a civil
complaint. (ECF No. 1.) Elam's complaint concerns events
that allegedly occurred while he was a pretrial detainee at
the Lake County Jail in Tiptonville, Tennessee. (ECF No. 1 at
1-2; ECF No. 1-3.) After Elam submitted the appropriate
financial documents, the Court issued an order granting leave
to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil
filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 7.) The
Clerk shall record the Defendants as the Lake County
Sheriff's Department, and Deputies Keith Ozment and
alleges that on August 23, 2018, Deputy Ozment assaulted him
while escorting him from the Lake County Courthouse. (ECF No.
1 at PageID 1.) He alleges that Ozment choked him while he
was handcuffed and wearing shackles on his waist and legs.
(Id.) Deputy Hayes was present, but Elam does not
allege that he participated in the assault. (Id.)
Specifically, Elam alleges that one of his wrists was
handcuffed to Ozment and the other wrist was handcuffed to
Hayes. (Id. at PageID 2.) Elam alleges that he has
permanent scars on his wrists from the incident.
alleges that he twice attempted to grieve the incident using
inmate request forms because “there is not any
grievance forms available to inmates incarcerated at Lake
County Sheriff's Department.” (Id.) He
states he also made “two or three verbal attempts to
have action taken.” (Id.)
does not specify what relief he seeks in this lawsuit.
However, he does seek a temporary restraining order (TRO)
against Deputy Ozment. (Id. at PageID 3.) Elam
contends that he “ha[s] reason to fear for my
life.” (Id.) Elam says that, even after he is
no longer incarcerated, he “still will be in fear due
to the deputy possessing legal authority to harass,
intimidate, or even take my life by means of anger in my
filing of the administrative grievance complaint” and
this lawsuit. (Id.) He asserts that a TRO is
necessary for him “to have any mental peace of mind and
faith in the legal authorities that are to uphold the law and
not break or violate it.” (Id.)
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d
1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).
Court construes Elam's filing as an action brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state ...