United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINTS, GRANTING LEAVE TO
FURTHER AMEND AND DENYING PENDING MOTIONS
JAMES
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
September 16, 2019, Plaintiff Julian Earl, a former inmate at
the Madison County Criminal Justice Complex (CJC) in Jackson,
Tennessee, filed a pro se civil complaint and a
motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF
Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order on October 21,
2019, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis
and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 11.) After Earl informed the Clerk he
was no longer incarcerated (ECF No. 14), the Court directed
him to either renew his pauper status or pay the remainder of
the civil filing fee. (ECF No. 15.) Earl complied, (ECF No.
17), and the Court granted his motion to renew his in
forma pauperis status. (ECF No. 19.)
Earl
also has filed two amended complaints, (ECF Nos. 5 & 7),
which appear to supplement, rather than supersede, his
original complaint. The Court will therefore consider the
allegations in all three complaints. The Clerk shall record
the Defendants as Quality Correctional Health Care (QCHC) and
Madison County.[1]
Earl
alleges that on August 31, 2019, he was taken from the CJC to
Jackson General Hospital for a heart attack he had suffered.
(ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) After he returned to the CJC on
September 3, 2019, his defibrillator[2] “started going off
every morning at 10:20AM.” (Id.) He alleges he
has complained “to Medical” about the issue, but
they assured him that “it was suppose[d] to do
this.” (Id.)
Earl
separately alleges that when he first arrived at the CJC, he
was given no medication for seven days, even though he
brought the medication with him. (Id.) He also was
forced to sleep on cold concrete for five days, which drained
the batteries in his defibrillator and caused his heart rate
to spike, even though CJC staff was aware of his heart
condition. (Id. at PageID 2-3; ECF No. 5 at PageID
15.) Earl alleges that after his emergency hospital visit,
CJC staff “was informed to give me 2 mattresses,
” but they did not provide any. (ECF No. 5 at PageID
15.)
Earl
further alleges that he was sent back to the hospital for two
weeks, which he had to spend in the ICU because of his
malfunctioning defibrillator. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 22.) He
again returned to the CJC with a new heart medication, of
which he alleges he was told not to miss a single dose or he
“would be right back in the E.R.” (Id.)
Yet, he alleges, “the facility here still would not
acknowledge this[, ] and they had to rush me back up front
until they got them.” (Id.)
Earl
alleges that unnamed CJC staff either refused him medication
or improperly discontinued it in 2016 and in August 2018.
(Id. at PageID 23.) He accuses the CJC medical
department of “totally neglect[ing] the[ir] job of
giving the proper medical attention and responding in a
timely fashion.” (Id.) He also complains about
the delay in, and costs of, receiving treatment and alleges
that unnamed nurses mis-prescribe medication. (Id.
at PageID 23-24.) He also alleges that grievances he has
submitted about the problems with the medical staff and
treatment have gone unanswered. (Id. at PageID 27.)
Earl
wants “the Medical Staff & Agency held accountable
for their Medical Neglect” and unspecified
compensation. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5; ECF No. 5 at PageID
16.)
The
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
In
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
“Pro
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ...