United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
CHRISTOPHER D. HARTNEY, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHNNY ALEXANDER, ET AL., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO
AMEND
JAMES
D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On
October 4, 2019, Plaintiff Christopher D. Hartney, who is
incarcerated at the Hardin County Correctional Facility
(HCCF) in Savannah, Tennessee, filed a pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The
Court issued an order on October 7, 2019, granting leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil
filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The
Clerk shall record the Defendants as Hardin County Sheriff
Johnny Alexander, HCCF Administrator Tracy White and Nurse
Amanda Moore.
Hartney
alleges that he has an eight-inch open wound on his leg for
which he has been refused treatment at the HCCF. (ECF No. 1
at PageID 2.) He alleges that the staff at the HCCF will not
treat his wound because “it happen[e]d before I got
arrest[ed].” (Id.) He alleges that the wound
leaks and that his skin around the wound is rotten.
(Id.) Hartney alleges that “the Staff at the
H.C.C.F.” are aware of his injury, but they will not
“treat it or give me cream or
Bandages.”[1] (Id. at PageID 4.)
Hartney
also alleges he is in an eight-man cell and that his seven
cellmates “have to look at my leg and see how gross it
looks, and they don't want to be around it.”
(Id.) Hartney states that his cellmates “give
me problems, but they know it[']s the H.C.C.F.
[f]ault.” (Id.) He alleges that he is in both
physical and mental pain because “[e]veryone else in my
cell has to look at [his leg].” (Id.)
Hartney
requests medical treatment for his leg and monetary damages.
(Id. at PageID 6.)
The
Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to
dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the
complaint-
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
In
assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the standards under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007),
are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71
(6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's
“well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and
then determines whether the allegations “plausibly
suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ”
and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual
allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although
a complaint need only contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless
requires factual allegations to make a
“‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion,
of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555 n.3.
“Pro
se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and
should therefore be liberally construed.”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro
se litigants, however, are not exempt from the
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612,
613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro
se complaint for failure to comply with “unique
pleading requirements” and stating “a court
cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not
spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v.
Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169
(6th Cir. 1975))).
Hartney
filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two
elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the
“Constitution and laws” of the United States (2)
committed by a defendant acting under color of state ...