Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Cannon v. United States

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, Chattanooga

December 11, 2019

CALVIN D. CANNON, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

          Christopher H. Steger, Magistrate Judge

          MEMORANDUM OPINION

          TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         Before the Court is Petitioner's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1 in No. 1:19-cv-235; Doc. 52 in No. 1:99-cr-75). For the following reasons, Petitioner's motion will be DENIED.

         I. BACKGROUND

         In 2000, Petitioner pleaded guilty to distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. (See Doc. 50 in No. 1:99-cr-75.) United States District Court Judge Curtis Collier determined that Petitioner qualified as a career offender under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1 and sentenced him to 200 months' imprisonment, followed by six years of supervised release. (Id.) Petitioner did not appeal his sentence but did file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255 on May 6, 2002. (See Doc. 1 in No. 1:02-cv-150.) The district court dismissed the motion as untimely on July 31, 2002 (Doc. 7 in No. 1:02-cv-150), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution (Doc. 9 in No. 1:02-cv-150).

         In November 2015, after completing the custodial portion of his federal-court sentence, and while on supervised release, Petitioner pleaded guilty to aggravated assault in state court and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. (Id.) On July 11, 2018, Judge Collier revoked Petitioner's supervised release after he admitted to violating the terms of his supervised release, including being convicted for aggravated assault. (Id.) At the revocation hearing, Petitioner's counsel acknowledged that the aggravated-assault conviction constituted a Grade A violation but requested that the Court vary downward and sentence him as if he had committed a Grade B or C violation to avoid duplicating the state court's six-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated-assault offense. (Id.) Judge Collier sentenced Petitioner to three years' incarceration with no supervised release to follow. (Doc. 44 in No. 1:99-cr-75.)

         Petitioner appealed Judge Collier's revocation sentence to the Sixth Circuit. (See Doc. 46 in No. 1:99-cr-75.) On March 26, 2019, the Sixth Circuit affirmed Judge Collier's revocation sentence as procedurally reasonable, noting that Judge Collier adequately considered the relevant factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and explained the reason for the sentence imposed. (Doc. 50 in No. 1:99-cr-75.)

         On August 20, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. (Doc. 1 in No. 1:19-cv-235; Doc. 52 in No. 1:99-cr-75.) In his motion, Petitioner appears to argue that: (1) the First Step Act, Pub. L. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018), reduced the applicable statutory range for his sentence and supervised release on his underlying cocaine-distribution conviction such that he is entitled to immediate release from his incarceration for violating the terms of his supervised release; (2) not reducing his sentence under the First Step Act would violate Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013); (3) he no longer qualifies as a career offender under United States Sentencing Guideline § 4B1.1; (4) the district court failed to adequately explain its basis for his revocation sentence; and (5) he is entitled to a jury in connection with revocation of his supervised release under United States v. Haymond, 139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019). (See generally Doc. 1 in No. 1:19-cv-235.) Petitioner's motion is now ripe for the Court's review.

         II. STANDARD OF LAW

         To obtain relief under § 2255, a petitioner must demonstrate: “(1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law . . . so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Short v. United States, 471 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mallett v. United States, 334 F.3d 491, 496-97 (6th Cir. 2003)). The petitioner “must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal” and establish a “fundamental defect in the proceedings which necessarily results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an egregious error violative of due process.” Fair v. United States, 157 F.3d 427, 430 (6th Cir. 1998).

         Additionally, in ruling on a motion made pursuant to § 2255, the Court must determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. “An evidentiary hearing is required unless the record conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Martin v. United States, 889 F.3d 827, 832 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Campbell v. United States, 686 F.3d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). “The burden for establishing entitlement to an evidentiary hearing is relatively light, and where there is a factual dispute, the habeas court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the petitioner's claims.” Martin, 889 F.3d at 832 (internal quotations omitted). While a petitioner's “mere assertion of innocence” does not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing, the district court cannot forego an evidentiary hearing unless “the petitioner's allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.” Id. When petitioner's factual narrative of the events is not contradicted by the record and not inherently incredible and the government offers nothing more than contrary representations, the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id.

         III. ANALYSIS

         A. Petitioner's Claims Related to his Original Sentence

         To the extent Petitioner seeks relief under § 2255 in connection with the Court's original sentence set forth in its judgment dated May 16, 2000, those claims fail for at least two reasons. First, because Petitioner previously filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (Doc. 1 in No. 1:02-cv-150), the Court cannot consider a second motion to vacate, set aside, or correct related to his original sentence unless Petitioner first obtains authorization ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.