Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Williams v. Chester County Sheriff's Department

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division

December 18, 2019

PHILLIP LEE WILLIAMS, JR., Plaintiff,
v.
CHESTER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, ET AL., Defendants.

          ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND

          JAMES D. TODD UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

         On November 8, 2019, Plaintiff Phillip Lee Williams, Jr., who is incarcerated at the Chester County Justice Center (CCJC) in Henderson, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1 & 2.) The Court issued an order on November 13, 2019, granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessing the civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b). (ECF No. 4.) The Clerk shall record the Defendants as the Chester County Sheriff's Department, the CCJC, and the Henderson Police Department.

         Williams alleges that the Sheriff's Department and CCJC have discriminated against him by refusing to provide him “proper medical attention.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 2.) He alleges that “the bone specialist[]” recommended surgery on Williams's thumb, but the Sheriff's Department and CCJC “wouldn't sign off on it.” (Id.)

         Williams also alleges that “[t]hey are refusing to give me due process” in his ongoing state-court criminal matter. (Id.) He alleges that statements of the officers involved (whose names he does not provide) do not match statements from medical examiners (whose names he also does not provide) and that pictures taken by the Tennessee Highway Patrol do not match the pictures taken by investigators. (Id.) He asserts that evidence has been lost of fabricated. (Id.)

         Williams also alleges that “They” prevented him from taking a GED class, took away his Koran in July 2018 and refused to allow him another one, [1] do not allow inmates to have “urban books” written by black authors or illustrators, refuse to answer his grievances, “cut the mayor out of the picture, ” separated the white inmates from the black inmates, and have given his outgoing legal mail to the Jail Administrator and Chief Deputy Sheriff Mark Griffin. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 4.)

         Williams seeks an order directing the CJC to provide him proper medical treatment and monetary compensation. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.) He also wants “them to be held accountable and stop running things the way they want to and start following the rules and treat all people equal.” (Id.)

         The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint-

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

         In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the standards under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007), are applied. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court accepts the complaint's “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.'” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). Conclusory allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth, ” and legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), Rule 8 nevertheless requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3.

         “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,' and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants, however, are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading'” (quoting Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

         Williams filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.