United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY RESPONDENT, GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS, DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND
DENYING LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
DANIEL BREEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Carlos Morris, filed a pro se habeas corpus petition
(the “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. (Docket Entry (“D.E.”) 1.) Respondent,
Herbert Slatery III,  moved to dismiss the Petition as untimely.
(D.E. 12.) For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED,
and the Petition is DISMISSED.
February 2000, Petitioner pleaded guilty in the Henderson
County, Tennessee, Circuit Court to two counts of possession
of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, and
he was sentenced to two concurrent eight-year terms of
imprisonment. (D.E. 1-2 at PageID 25-26.) In October 2006,
Morris pleaded guilty in the Madison County, Tennessee,
Circuit Court to three drug offenses, as well as failure to
obey a stop sign. (Id. at PageID 27-30.) On those
convictions, he received an effective sentence of eight
years, to run concurrently with his Henderson County
sentences. (Id.) Judgment was entered on October 25,
March 2016, Petitioner filed a motion in state court to
correct his Madison County sentences, arguing that the
sentences are illegal under state law. (D.E. 11-1 at PageID
59-65.) The trial court dismissed the action. (Id.
at PageID 69-70.) The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed the lower court's decision, and the Tennessee
Supreme Court denied discretionary review. See State v.
Morris, No. W2017-00129-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 3836024, at
*3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2017), perm. appeal
denied (Tenn. Feb. 15, 2018).
inmate filed his Petition in this Court on June 18, 2018,
challenging his Madison County convictions. (D.E. 1 at PageID
1.) On April 18, 2019, Respondent moved to dismiss the
Petition as untimely. (D.E. 12 at PageID 143.) Morris filed a
reply opposing the motion. (D.E. 13.)
§ 2254 petition is subject to a one-year limitations
period, commencing from four possible dates:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
one-year limitations period is tolled during the time
“a properly filed application for State post-conviction
or other collateral review . . . is pending[.]” 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The time bar is also subject to
equitable tolling where the petitioner demonstrates
“that he has been pursuing his rights diligently”
and “that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his
way and prevented ...